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Abstract
Perceived Knowledge and Expectations: Essays on Individual Choice Behavior
by
Iansa Melo Ferreira
This dissertation is composed of three Experimental papers on individual choice be-
havior. On the first I discuss decision making process within ambiguous settings and
how ambiguity aversion and contrast effects can affect choice behavior. In this work
two types of ambiguity are defined: Subjective Ambiguity, where outcome probabilities
are well defined but not known to the decision maker; and Intrinsic Ambiguity, where
decision maker’s perception about outcome probabilities are subject to sudden changes.
Using these two concepts separately, I performed an experiment to test how does the flow
of one’s own knowledge perception behaves. The results suggest distinct choice patterns
for each ambiguity type. I find that intrinsic ambiguity tends to enhance recency bias.
Also the distance between 2 events has a clear effect when the decisions involve subjec-
tively ambiguous events, but not so if probabilities are uncertain. Finally, the existence
of an intermediate event with a distinct bias from that of the baseline does not reduce the
influence of that baseline over the individual’s knowledge perception. On the second pa-
per I present a laboratory experiment designed to shed light into the role of expectations
on workers’ reciprocal behavior when a cut in wages takes place. Previous literature has
studied reciprocity without expectation formation, but if expectations enter individuals’
loss-gain utility, they may affect perception and effort choices. Using fixed wages and
productivity-dependent profits, I measure workers’ responses to a cut in wages in situa-
tions where that cut was more expected, as well as when it was less expected. Results
are consistent with the notion of reciprocity and also with the idea that expectations can
ix
influence workers’ reciprocal behavior, so that workers effort varies less when wages were
expected. Lastly, the third paper explores the effect of a movie trailer over the enjoyment
of a short movie, using a lab experiment. The results show that the average enjoyment
for was higher for the Control group than for the Treatment (Advertisement) group. In
fact, on average, the difference between individuals’ predicted and realized enjoyments
(before and after watching the movie) was twice as much for the Control than for the
Treatment group.
x
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Chapter 1
Perceived Knowledge and
Ambiguity: An Experimental Study
1.1 Introduction
The choices we make are not isolated events. Generally, when making a choice indi-
viduals tend to draw comparisons using their own past experiences or previously acquired
knowledge and the options at hand. Further, when faced with a string of similar decisions
such as the interview of prospective employees, food or beverage tasting, speed dating,
etc. individuals tend to carry on to the next decision a baseline judgment generated
from the qualifications of previous ones.1 A behavior which, by extrapolation, we should
expect when evaluating policies, programs, stock portfolios, etc.
In fact, comparative judgment should be expected whenever choice-objects contain
intrinsic ambiguity, such that the decision maker’s understanding of procedures, pros
and cons are likely to affect his choices. For that same reason to better understand
1Unlike a Bayesian updating process, each event can be (and in many cases is) independent from the
other ones, such that no new information is brought in, just a new perception of the existing information.
1
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the decision making process within ambiguous settings, two types of ambiguity are here
defined. Subjective Ambiguity, where outcome probabilities are well defined, but not
known to the decision maker; and Intrinsic Ambiguity, where decision maker’s perception
about outcome probabilities are subject to sudden changes.2
Previous research shows that once an individual is presented with a highly desirable
alternative, she is likely to update her impressions and judge subsequent options more
harshly. Similarly, when first presented with a highly undesirable option, individuals are
more likely to recalibrate, and accept not so good alternatives (e.g. Fox and Weber, 2002
[1]; Bhargava and Fisman, 2014 [2]).
A similar pattern can be observed when individuals evaluate their own knowledge
regarding similar choice-objects. In evaluating ambiguous lotteries, for example, we
should expect individuals to bet higher (overall) on the lotteries which pertain events
they believe to be more familiar to them, and less on the ones that feature events about
which they have less knowledge.
The Comparative Ignorance Hypothesis (Fox and Tversky, 1995 [3]) suggests that
people don’t classify their knowledge in absolute terms, instead they tend to draw com-
parisons based on previous experiences or on the knowledge of others. Fox and Weber
(2002) [1] used ambiguity intrinsic events to show that when previously presented with a
highly familiar event, people are likely to underestimate their own knowledge regarding
an average familiarity one; and when previously presented with an unfamiliar event, they
tend to overestimate their knowledge about the same average familiarity one (study 1, p.
481).
Following this literature, this paper advances the understanding of how the percep-
tion of one’s own knowledge can be affected by framing and comparison. More specifi-
2Such changes can come from availability of new information, such as the knowledge of an incoming
storm can change weather perspectives; or from the learning of relevant third party opinions, such as
opinions regarding the future returns of a given stock option.
2
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cally, whether the increase in the distance between the comparable information influences
knowledge perception;3 whether the presence of an intermediate event with a contrasting
familiarity level promotes a diminished effect; and whether the structure of ambiguity
(Subjective or Intrinsic) plays a role on individuals’ perception of their own knowledge.
This paper contributes to the ongoing research on contrast and comparison effects
on choice behavior by bringing a double analysis of such effects. It differs from previous
literature as it experimentally elicits perception of knowledge for the two distinct struc-
tures of ambiguity on decision strings. Further, it uses the same pool of subjects and
the same treatments, allowing for a cleaner comparison between effects across these two
settings.
The experimental results suggest that distance between choice events may play a role
in individuals’ perception of knowledge. However, they also indicate that intrinsic am-
biguity diminishes these effects, perhaps a feature of bounded rationality, which should
be more pronounced when more parameters are at stake. As for the role of intermediate
events on one’s perception, again only the subjectively ambiguous lotteries presented sig-
nificant results. Surprisingly, they indicate that the role of intermediate events may differ
completely from that of the baseline (first) event presented, perhaps yielding assimilation
rather than contrast, and allowing for a larger spread on acceptable choices.
1.2 Risk, Ambiguity and Choices
According to the literature, ambiguity aversion does not come from an inability to
establish subjective probabilities to a certain event, but from the change in the will to
act due to the lower weight of evidence, or yet due to a matter of source preference
3Here, distance stands for the amount of information visited by the decision maker in between the
events, which may (or not) weaken the perceptive memory acquired from the baseline event (first event
faced).
3
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(Keynes, 1921 [4]; Ellsberg, 1961 [5]; Becker and Brownson, 1964 [6]). But, how do
people act when facing ambiguity? How to classify behavior towards ambiguity when it
is not contrasted with a risky option? And finally, how do ambiguous settings and events
change individuals’ choice behavior?
In 1921, Frank Knight [7] differentiated measurable uncertainty, risk, and unmeasur-
able uncertainty, ambiguity or Knightian uncertainty. Also in 1921, Keynes [4] pointed
out that people base their decisions on two things: 1) Judged Probability - which regards
the probability an individual believes to be true for a certain event; and 2) Weight of Ev-
idence - which corresponds to the credibility of the source of the individual’s underlying
information.
A few years later, the Expected Utility Theory (Von Neumann and Morgenstern,
1949 [8]) came about regarding risky choices, and later the Subjective Expected Utility
Theory (Savage, 1954 [9]) contemplated ambiguity in a risk-like setting. In 1961, Daniel
Ellsberg [5] used urns with proportions of red and black balls in order to show that people
do not necessarily behave according to (subjective) expected utility, instead they tend to
avoid situations where probabilities are not entirely clear.
Becker and Brownson (1964) [6] performed an experiment similar to Ellsberg’s but
found no exact pattern regarding ambiguity preferences, but indications that individuals
who may find ambiguity desirable in a given situation, may find it undesirable under
different conditions. Yet, Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) [10] modeled Ellsberg’s idea
of ambiguity aversion pointing out that if individuals are assumed to have a max-min
expected utility Ellsberg’s findings are completely in line with rational choice behavior.
Further pursuing the understanding of what came to be known as “ambiguity aver-
sion” the Prospect Theory and the Cumulative Prospect Theory by Kahneman and
Tversky (1979 [11] and 1992 [12]) suggested that individuals use two weighting scales
on their decision making process, one regarding the probability of the outcome, and one
4
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regarding the outcomes themselves.
Heath and Tversky (1991) [13] proposed that individuals would rather face an am-
biguous choice to face a risky one as long as the former concerned a familiar subject.
Their Competence Hypothesis postulates that agents’ willingness to bet in an ambiguous
event depends not only on its estimated probability of occurrence, but also on the knowl-
edge or competence the individuals possess (or believe to possess) regarding that event.4
Therefore, when facing risky and ambiguous situations, for a given level of judged proba-
bility, perceived knowledge could drive individuals to an ambiguity-seeking behavior with
the idea that “they generally do better in situations they understand than in situations
they have less knowledge” (p.9), an indication that, in a Prospect Theory setting, the
lack of precision may not affect the probability weighting scale.
Charness and Gneezy (2010) [14] also found some evidence of this when discussing
ambiguity aversion in a stock market setting. Using Ellsberg two-color urns and an in-
between design, the authors evaluated individuals’ willingness to pay to avoid ambiguity
(by betting on the risky urn), and also willingness to invest in each case (ambiguous and
risky). Results showed that participants were willing to pay to avoid ambiguity, however
the amounts invested didn’t change across treatments, which indicates that people may
be averse to ambiguity, but when facing it, they tend to act (choose the amount to bet)
on the same grounds as on a risky situation.
Many experimental papers tested how people behave regarding ambiguous versus
risky events. However, in real life choices, we hardly find risky events with which to
compare the ambiguous ones we face. In fact, the level and structure of the ambiguity that
permeates most decisions on our daily lives can hardly be mimicked by risk. Therefore,
before we try to understand individual behavior in face of uncertainty, it is worthwhile
4The fundamental aspect is the individual’s evaluation regarding his knowledge/competence.
Whether his perception is a reflection of the truth is irrelevant. It is his subjective sentiment regarding
his own competence level that will be the driving aspect.
5
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to think how different topics or events may present distinct ambiguity structures, and
thus trigger different behavioral patterns. Here we’ll deal with two ambiguity structures,
as defined below:
• Subjective Ambiguity : Individual specific ambiguity, where the event itself has well-
defined probabilities to each possible outcome. However, the decision maker is
unaware of these probabilities and will, at best, make an educated guess regarding
the outcomes. Examples of this type of ambiguity include Ellsberg’s urns, and
yes-or-no bets on factual events;
• Intrinsic Ambiguity : The event is inherently ambiguous in the sense that there
are no well-defined probabilities. Instead, perception of probabilities for any given
outcome are subject to sudden changes such that there are no ex-ante “correct
answers”. Examples of it include stock behavior, and future weather outcomes.5
The literature shows evidence that behavior is similar in risky and (subjectively)
ambiguous situations, but how does it compare across our two ambiguity structures?
We are often faced with strings of decisions which can influence each other by ordering,
comparison and contrast. However, especially when dealing with intrinsically ambiguous
events, it is hard to evaluate choices using Bayesian or any other “hard-structured”
analysis method. That’s when we need to appeal to our previously acquired knowledge,
or yet to how much we believe to know, in order to establish our beliefs and make choices.
When discussing behavior in comparative situations, using non-ambiguous choices,
Moore (1999) [15] argued that people are unlikely to have pre-establish global preferences,
which would require preferences over an infinity of possibilities.6 The literature shows
5Here, the number of factors which can influence the outcomes is not countable, and several of them
can drastically change decision maker’s probability judgment.
6Recall that dimensions such as time, place and state of the world can affect a good’s desirability.
6
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evidence that comparative and contrast effects may affect both ambiguous and non-
ambiguous lotteries in a similar fashion (See for example: Keppe and Weber, 1995 [16];
Moore, 1999 [15]; Heath and Tversky, 1991 [13]).
Fox and Tversky (1995) [3] developed the Comparative Ignorance Hypothesis (CIH),
which postulates that when facing ambiguous events, an individual will adopt a baseline
parameter and evaluate new choice events by drawing comparisons with that baseline.7
They showed evidence that when people are asked to price a prospect in context of
another “they become sensitive to the contrast in their knowledge regarding the two
events and as a result they price the less familiar or vaguer prospect lower than the more
familiar or clearer prospect” (p.599). In that sense, a decision maker could be brought
to believe herself more or less knowledgeable about a given event by the establishment
of the appropriate baseline comparison parameter.
Further, the authors used choices in comparative and non-comparative settings to
show evidence that source preference is inherently comparative. They found that the
effects are more clearly observable with comparison between risky and ambiguous lotter-
ies, than when comparing different levels of ambiguity. Also, when in isolation, an event
will be analyzed using typical Bayesian methods, however in the presence of comparable
events, judgments are likely to be biased.
Chow and Sarin (2001) [17] also tested for the comparative effects observed by Fox
and Tversky. Their results supported an ambiguity averse behavior even without com-
parison. However, such an aversion was much decreased in the absence of a risky alterna-
tive. According to the authors, the difference observed between the comparative and the
non-comparative scenarios may happen because in a non-comparative setting, ambiguity
becomes a secondary issue, and as such may be under-evaluated by the participants.
7In general the baseline will be given by the first event faced for a given topic, or a comparable
category.
7
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Another explanation could be that risky lotteries are more easily evaluated, becoming a
reference for the individual when she prices ambiguous ones. Finally, one may argue that
the lack of knowledge in an ambiguous lottery becomes more evident when a comparable
risky alternative is available - which is the case for most subjectively ambiguous lotteries
(see Hsee, 1996 [18] and Hsee et al., 1999 [19]).
Fox and Weber (2002) [1] designed and performed five experiments to test whether
enhancing perceived knowledge would exacerbate source preference. In their experiments
the authors evaluated how perceived knowledge could be influenced by the establishment
of a more (or less) familiar baseline event;8 or by the addition (or not) of extra infor-
mation which suggested the existence of more knowledgeable individuals. Their findings
support that relative knowledge plays a large role on choice behavior in a comparative
context, and that source preference is more pronounced when in the presence of compar-
ison parameters.
Ferreira and Resende (2011) [20] revisited the Comparative Ignorance Hypothesis by
performing an experiment where 270 students from the University of Bras´ılia, Brazil,
priced intrinsically ambiguous lotteries regarding future weather conditions in three dif-
ferent locations. The participants were randomly divided into four groups. Each group
was asked to price two or three lotteries regarding events of distinct familiarity levels
according to the treatment received, as shown in order: 1A) low-familiarity, average-
familiarity; 1B) high-familiarity, average-familiarity; 2A) low-familiarity, high-familiarity,
average-familiarity; and 2B) high-familiarity, low-familiarity, average-familiarity.
The results corroborated the CIH as verified by Fox and Weber (2002) [1]. Further,
on three-events questionnaires (treatments 2A and 2B), the comparative effect from the
first event presented (baseline) was carried out to the last event (target), despite the
8The authors used either events that were highly familiar, or events that were highly unfamiliar
to participants as a baseline, in the intent to bias their perception of knowledge regarding an average
familiarity event pertaining the same topic.
8
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existence of opposing intermediate event. However, the mean price given to an average-
familiarity lottery on a three-event questionnaire showed a smaller effect than the one
observed on the two-event questionnaire for a given baseline, suggesting that the presence
of intermediate events may reduce the bias brought up by comparison. These results
opened the question of whether the comparative bias decreased - from a two-event to
a three-event questionnaire - due to a bigger distance between the first and the last
lotteries, or because the intermediate event presented a familiarity level that strongly
differs from that of the baseline.
The following session presents an experiment designed to test the effects of distance
and familiarity of intermediate events on ambiguous choices. The objective is to under-
stand how comparisons are performed when decision makers face a string of ambiguous
decisions, what is more likely to affect final results, and whether the formation of per-
ceived knowledge behaves similarly for subjective and intrinsically ambiguous decisions.
1.3 Experimental Design and Hypothesis
In order to evaluate how comparative knowledge is affected by the distance between
events and the familiarity level of these events, two questionnaire types were formulated,
each contemplating a different kind of ambiguity. Both questionnaires consist of the
ordered presentation/evaluation of two or four events, according to one of three possible
treatments designed to test our two main hypothesis. The treatments were:
• T1: Low-familiarity (LF); Average-familiarity1 (AF1);
• T2: Low-familiarity; Average-familiarity2 (AF2); Average-familiarity3 (AF3); Average-
familiarity1
• T3: Low-familiarity; Average-familiarity2; High-familiarity; Average-familiarity1
9
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Given the treatments we can define our two main hypothesis on perceived knowledge
in terms of a target event E, and the baseline event (first event presented):
H1: The further away an event E is from the baseline, the less it’s perceived
knowledge will be affected by that baseline.
Perceived Knowledge of AF1 | T1 > Perceived Knowledge of AF1 | T2
H2: The existence of an intermediate event which’s familiarity degree
strongly differs from the one of the baseline, will reduce the influence of the
baseline over the individual’s perception of knowledge regarding event E.
Perceived Knowledge of AF1 | T2 > Perceived Knowledge of AF1 | T3
Charness and Gneezy (2010) [14] found that individuals may show aversion to ambi-
guity, but once facing a (subjectively) ambiguous situation they tend to act in the same
manner as they would in a risk situation. However, it makes sense to think that when
dealing with intrinsic ambiguity, the lack of a comparable risk situation should drive
individuals to abide by some other “judgment base” in order to realize their choices.
It could be the case that this judgment base was defaulted to be the first event
presented (baseline), such that the judgment of each event will be anchored to that
baseline, diminishing the influence of intermediate events’ familiarity and distance over
one’s perceived knowledge (Ferreira and Resende, 2011 [20]). Another possible judgment
mechanism by the participants could be through a recency bias brought up by bounded
rationality. According to Erev and Haruvy (2013) [21], recency bias is to the tendency
of individuals to discount past information. Thus, given the more complex nature of
intrinsic ambiguity, and the consequent larger amount of parameters and alternatives to
be considered in the choice process, it is likely that boundedly rational agents will suffer
a stronger recency bias, which should diminish the effects of events placed further away,
reducing sequential judgment spillovers.
10
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With that in mind, we write our third hypothesis:
H3: Even though the type of ambiguity should not affect the direction of the
effects, intrinsic ambiguity should result in weaker effects.
Each participant responded to two questionnaires, undertaking only one treatment for
each kind of ambiguity. The events in each questionnaire type were chosen to maximize
the match between the desired familiarity level (by the experimenter) and the partici-
pants’ perceived familiarity level regarding each event. Recognizing that this perception
is unlikely to yield a perfect match, possibly jeopardizing the results, all questionnaires
were followed by a “knowledge sorting” sheet, where participants were asked to state how
knowledgeable they believed themselves to be on a scale of 1 (no knowledge) to 7 (perfect
knowledge) about each of the events they faced, allowing for the recognition and exclu-
sion of individuals whose knowledge-familiarity ordering conflicted with the familiarity
assumptions.9
Also, understanding the role of risk preferences on the choices made by the individuals
throughout the experiment, and the importance of controlling for this preferences, at the
beginning of each section participants were presented with a question meant to elicit risk
preference. Exact words below:
Suppose you were endowed with 100 lab tokens and asked what portion of
it (between 0 and 100, inclusive) you wish to invest in a risky investment.10
If the investment succeeds it will pay 2.5 times as many tokens as invested,
otherwise you’ll lose your investment. Each outcome happens with a 50%
probability, and what you don’t invest is yours to keep.
How many tokens would you invest?
9This scale was used by Resende and Wu (2010) [22], and Ferreira and Resende (2011) [20].
10Payments for this phase were performed on an exchange rate of 1 token = US$0.05, and made out
to 20% of the participants chosen at random in each session.
11
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This method, known as the Gneezy and Potters method (Gneezy and Potters, 1997
[23]; Charness et. al., 2013 [24]), was chosen due to its simplicity regarding participant
understanding and lab performance.11 Although it does not allow for a distinction be-
tween risk-neutral and risk-seeking individuals, it allows for a scaling on risk-aversion,
which can be controlled on data analysis.12
1.3.1 Intrinsically Ambiguous Events: Weather Lotteries
In this questionnaire based on Fox and Tversky (1995) [3] (See also Fox and Weber,
2002 [1]; and Ferreira and Resende, 2011 [20]) each participant was exposed to one event
at a time, according to the treatment received. The events used were:
• Low-familiarity event (Baseline): Late-April’s temperature at the city of Annaba,
Annaba Province;13
• Average-familiarity event 1 (Target): Late-April’s temperature at the city of Dou-
glas, Arizona;
• Average-familiarity event 2 : Late-April’s temperature at the city of Moscow, Ten-
nessee;
• Average-familiarity event 3 : Late-April’s temperature at Oklahoma City, Okla-
homa;
• High-familiarity event : Late-April’s temperature at the city of Sacramento, Cali-
fornia.
11I thank professor Gary Charness for pointing out this method and its advantages.
12In this task, any risk-neutral or risk-seeking agent should opt for investing all the tokens, since the
expected gains are always higher than the initial endowment.
13Annaba is a province in Algeria. However, this piece of information was withheld from participants
in order to minimize familiarity with the event.
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The events (cities) were chosen based on participants’ expected knowledge, as well
as on the cities’ average temperature around the target month (April). For each chosen
city, the likelihood of the elected temperature to happen on the elected date is roughly
the same, but participants should present a distinct knowledge perception across events.
Each participant was asked to price 2 or 4 lotteries (according to treatment) on the cities’
temperatures, as shown below:14
Suppose you were offered a lottery ticket which would pay US$100 if the
highest afternoon temperature in the city of [CITY, LOCATION] was at
least 60F, on the next April 25th. How much would you be willing to pay for
that lottery ticket?
I’d be willing to pay US$
Suppose you were offered a lottery ticket which would pay US$100 if the
highest afternoon temperature in the city of [CITY, LOCATION] was less
than 60F, on the next April 25th. How much would you be willing to pay for
that lottery ticket?
I’d be willing to pay US$
Participants were informed that there were no wrong answers, and that they should
think carefully about what would be their true reservation prices for each lottery ticket.
They were also asked to price complementary lotteries independently, and not as if they
could acquire both to ensure winning. Finally, they were told that they were not to look
either back or forth in order to answer a question, but should take them one at a time,
as presented in each questionnaire.
14The experiment was performed on April 12th, making the temperature on April 25th an intrinsically
ambiguous, but not too far off, event.
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In order to avoid distortions regarding ordering and beliefs, some balancing efforts
were made. For each event, half of questionnaires were written offering first a lottery
that would pay for an afternoon temperature “at least 60F”, and then one which paid
for a temperature “less than 60F”, while the other half faced the opposite ordering. All
analysis were performed on the sum of prices reported for each event on complementary
lotteries.15
By eliciting individuals’ willingness to pay for a given set of lotteries, we may get a
perspective on how does the flow of perceived knowledge influences their choices. Accord-
ing to previous literature, the less confident an individual feels about an event, the less
she would be willing to bet on it, which would reduce the total any one individual would
be willing to pay for a given event (sum of complementary lotteries) as her perceived
knowledge regarding that event grows fainter. Since all treatments end with the same
event (Average Familiarity1), we should expect the elicited price for its occurrence to
indicate how knowledgeable individuals feel about that last event when they reach it.
If distance reduces the effect of the baseline over the last event’s knowledge perception
(H1), we should expect to have individuals pricing the target lottery more expensively
on treatment 1 than on treatment 2, once the addition of the two intermediate events
should decrease the upward bias promoted by the low-familiarity baseline.
Also, if the individual’s familiarity with intermediate events should matter, as pre-
dicted by H2, we should expect a higher price for the last lottery on treatment 2 then on
treatment 3, since the latter presents a high-familiarity event which should diminish the
baseline’s effect.
15This procedure is common on previous literature, and aims to avoid distortions generated by common
beliefs regarding the any of the cities’ temperatures used in the questionnaires, as well as to be consistent
with the idea of source preference (see for example Fox and Tversky, 1995 [3]; Fox and Weber, 2002 [1];
Ferreira and Resende, 2011) [20].
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1.3.2 Subjectively Ambiguous Events: Capitals’ Lottery
Using the same pool of subjects and the same experimental setting,16 the second type
of questionnaires used the following events:
• Low-familiarity event : What is the capital of Estonia;
• Average-familiarity event 1 : What is the capital of New Zealand;
• Average-familiarity event 2 : What is the capital of Peru;
• Average-familiarity event 3 : What is the capital of Argentina;
• High-familiarity event : What is the capital of England.
In order to choose the events (countries) for this questionnaires, we performed a quick
survey with 13 undergraduate students from UCSB. In that survey, the students were
asked to use a scale of 1 (no knowledge) to 7 (perfect knowledge) to answer how did
they believe other people like themselves would feel about their knowledge regarding the
capitals of 9 countries.17
This time, participants were asked to state what city did they believed to be the
capital of the corresponding country, and invited to bet on their own answer, as shown
below:18
Q1 - What city do you believe to be the capital of [COUNTRY]?
I believe the capital of [COUNTRY] is
16Randomly assigned treatments, one per participant, using the same events differing only in the order
of presentation according to treatment, and also the presence of a knowledge sorting sheet at the end of
each questionnaire for matching purposes.
17Students were asked about the capitals of New Zealand, Albania, Peru, Czech Republic, Philippines,
Argentina, Chile, Paraguay and Brazil. For their participation on this survey, students had a chance to
win a US$20.00 prize on a random draw.
18Notice that the end bet constitutes a “yes or no question”, qualifying these as subjectively ambiguous
lotteries.
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Q2 - Would you prefer to receive US$10 if your guess is correct, or to receive
the same US$10 upon a coin flip? (Circle one)
[MY ANSWER] [COIN FLIP]
Should we expect distance to be influential (H1), the proportion of participants willing
to bet on their own answers for the target lottery should be higher on the first than on
the second treatment. And if the intermediate events matter (H2), we should expect less
people willing to bet on their own answers about the target on the third treatment than
on the second one.
Finally, in order to incentivize more reliable answers from this task, participants were
paid either US$10 or nothing according to their answers and individually performed coin
flips.19
1.4 Experimental Procedures and Results
The experimental sessions were performed in 3 distinct phases where each participant
responded to the risk elicitation task, and both the weather lotteries and the capitals’
lotteries questionnaires. Upon arrival, each participant was assigned an experimental
ID number, which they were asked to write on each questionnaire, allowing for the
experimenter to backtrack their elicited risk preferences, and their choice behavior at
each situation.
To minimize misunderstandings, participants were encouraged to ask questions as long
as those regarded procedures and protocols, not the research idea, nor the expectations
19In order to choose the event, a random draw out of 4 sets of 4 cards (Ace, 2, 3 and 4), performed
ex post, determined what event was paid for. For treatment 1 an odd number (Ace or 3) stood for the
first question, and an even (2 or 4) for the second one. For treatments 2 and 3, the card pinpointed the
exact event which paid off.
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(theirs or the experimenter’s) about results. As yet another balancing effort, in half of
the sessions, participants responded first to the intrinsically ambiguous questionnaires,
and then the subjectively ambiguous ones, while the other half responded to them in the
reversed order. All questionnaires were presented in paper, handed one at a time, and
specific instructions were read out loud and cleared before each questionnaire.20
One hundred and fifty six UCSB undergraduates participated on the experiment,
which was performed in 8 sessions along the same day. Upon arrival, each participant
was immediately entitled $5 show up fee, which she received at the end altogether with
any extra earnings from the capitals’ lottery and the risk preference eliciting task, when
applicable. Payments were made by handing opaque envelopes identified only by the
experimental IDs and containing the amount of cash corresponding to participant’s total
earnings.
Each treatment type questionnaire was responded by approximately one third of
participants. Questionnaire’s data was excluded from the sample whenever the knowledge
sorting (scale from 1 to 7) violated the assumption about relative familiarity levels.21
Once data was cleaned for relative knowledge assorting, 130 observations remained for
the lotteries with intrinsically ambiguous events, and 110 for the ones with subjectively
ambiguous events.
Since the idea is to understand the flow of perceived knowledge by measuring how
it reacts to framing and contrasts on a string of decisions, it is important that the
participants’ familiarity level with each of the events shows consistency with respect to
the desired orderings. Table 1.1 presents the average levels of familiarity for each event
20Neither of the balancing orders showed significant differences across groups.
21Since the knowledge rating is inherently relative, in order to be deemed acceptable an observation’s
rating only needed to abide by the ordering of knowledge. That is, no rating could be lower than the
one for the low knowledge event, no rating could be higher than the one for the high knowledge event
(when applicable), and average events had to be within a distance of at most 2 rating points from each
other.
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as stated by the participants on the knowledge sorting scales for each questionnaire type.
Table 1.1: Average of Reported Familiarity Levels for each Event and Questionnaire type
Weather Lotteries Capitals’ Lotteries
Low Familiarity (LF) 1.26 1.11
Average Familiarity 1 (AF1) 3.86 1.97
Average Familiarity 2 (AF2) 2.95 2.02
Average Familiarity 3 (AF3) 3.37 1.76
High Familiarity (HF) 5.03 4.27
NOTE: Average familiarity as reported on a scale of 1 through 7 by all respondents that faced the
event, for all observations which remained in the final sample.
Notice that, even though the uncertainty that permeates the weather events is deeper,
the reported familiarity levels were higher than the ones reported for capital’s lotteries
for every event type. One possible explanation is that given that subjective ambiguity
is closer to risk, in the sense that probabilities - despite being unknown - are fixed, it is
likely that individuals will draw a risk-ambiguity comparison by realizing that there are
other individuals who truly know the “more appropriate answer”. Such recognition may
promote an ambiguity aversion effect across all events analyzed, reducing the asserted
familiarity for these lotteries.
In the other hand, when dealing with intrinsic ambiguity the lack of a directly compa-
rable risk situation, and the understanding that perception of probabilities is unstable,
may drive individuals to believe themselves more likely to “know as much as others”
about the events, increasing the asserted familiarity for those lotteries in comparison to
the subjectively ambiguous ones.
For each questionnaire, the data analysis was done using tests and procedures that
best fitted the type of data. Both the familiarity level (knowledge assorting scale) and
the main results (weather lottery prices or confidence on one’s own answer for the capital
lotteries) were evaluated using nonparametric distributions tests and central moment
measures.
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1.4.1 Intrinsically Ambiguous Events
According to the first hypothesis, the further away an event is from the baseline,
the lower the effect on knowledge perception. To test that, treatments T1 and T2 were
used since both have the same initial lottery (baseline) and the same target lottery, but
treatment 2 presents two additional average familiarity questions in between these two.
Therefore by comparing their results we should expect the price individuals attribute to
the last lottery (pair), to be higher for first than the latter.
As for our second hypothesis, the presence of intermediate events with a contrasting
familiarity level should reduce but not reverse the initial bias. Treatments 2 and 3 have
the same low-familiarity baseline, and end in the same average-familiarity event (AF1),
but treatment 3 has a high-knowledge event for its third lottery, while treatment 2 has
only average familiarity ones as intermediate. Thus, by comparing their results we should
expect the price individuals attribute to the last lottery (pair), to be higher for treatment
2 then for treatment 3.
Table 1.2 shows that there is no significant differences on means and standard errors,
supporting neither of our hypotheses. And even though the means for lottery AF1
point out to results that contradict both hypothesis, those hypothesis rely on having an
equivalent valuation of the baseline lottery (LF), which is also shown to be different.
Table 1.2: Average Prices for the Weather Lotteries (in USD)
LF AF2 AF3 HF AF1
T1 26.975 35.785
(N=50) (4.502) (5.072)
T2 30.695 39.310 38.275 43.304
(N=46) (5.237) (5.693) (5.238) (5.571)
T3 41.007 48.157 52.728 51.738
(N=34) (7.015) (7.013) (7.082) (7.159)
NOTE: Average prices as given by the sum of complementary events lotteries
(at least and less than) per event, per treatment. Standard errors in parenthesis.
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The results observed in table 1.2 were corroborated by Ranksum and Kolmogorov-
Smirnov tests (table 1.3) which did not show statistically significant differences between
underlying distribution for the baseline (low knowledge event) as well as for the target
lottery (average familiarity event 1) across treatments.
Table 1.3: Results of the Non-Parametric Tests (p− values)
Hypothesis H0 pKS pR
PriceLF |T1− PriceLF |T2 = 0 0.998 0.694
H1 FamiliarityLF |T1− FamiliarityLF |T2 = 0 1.000 0.881
PriceAF1|T1− PriceAF1|T2 = 0 0.490 0.263
FamiliarityAF1|T1− FamiliarityAF1|T2 = 0 0.577 0.379
PriceLF |T2− PriceLF |T3 = 0 0.479 0.139
H2 FamiliarityLF |T2− FamiliarityLF |T3 = 0 1.000 0.682
PriceAF1|T2− PriceAF1|T3 = 0 0.619 0.402
FamiliarityAF1|T2− FamiliarityAF1|T3 = 0 0.625 0.245
Finally, linear regressions were performed to analyze the price attributed to the last
lottery as a function of the price attributed to the baseline; dummies for the existence
of intermediate events (treatments 2 and 3), and for the presence of a high-familiarity
event (treatment 3); and controls for the individual’s risk behavior, as measured by the
Gneezy and Potter’s method. The models complied with the following equation (results
on table 1.4).
PriceAF1 = α + β1PriceLF + β2DIST + β3High Fam+ γRB + 
As expected, the baseline lottery’s price (PriceLF ) has a positive and significant effect
on determining the target’s price in all tested models.22 According to the first regression
model (1), distance was not significant (p− value = 0.30), even when controlled for Risk
Behavior (model 2). Further, for both models (1) and (2) we have a counter-intuitive
22We expect a positive influence of the baseline because it is a low-familiarity event. Thus, it should
set a lower bar for the prices attributed to each lottery, according to the CIH.
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Table 1.4: Effects of Distance and Intermediate Events for Ambiguity Intrinsic Lotteries
PriceAF1 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
PriceLF 0.894** 0.866** 0.781** 0.736** 0.852** 0.828**
(0.095) (0.099) (0.095) (0.102) (0.073) (0.077)
DIST 4.192 4.899 4.349 5.064
(4.333) (4.257) (4.374) (4.285)
High Fam 0.377 1.390 -0.355 0.245
(6.368) (6.157) (6.271) (6.111)
Risk Behavior 0.189* 0.311* 0.196*
(0.078) (0.133) (0.077)
R2 0.67 0.69 0.57 0.60 0.65 0.66
Significance: **p < 0.01, and *p < 0.05.
result, which points a positive effect of the distance between baseline and target on the
target’s knowledge perception.
As for the our second hypothesis, the existence of an intermediate event with a
strongly different familiarity level (high familiarity) does not show any significant effect
at neither model (3) nor (4), suggesting that the presence of such an intermediate event
will not alter choice behavior for events with intrinsic ambiguity.23 Finally, for models
where both hypothesis were tested in conjunction, neither was corroborated, even when
risk behavior was controlled for (model 6).
1.4.2 Subjectively Ambiguous Events
The treatments used were the same as for intrinsically ambiguous events. Thus, given
the binary nature of these lotteries, we should expect that if distance matters as in H1,
the proportion of individuals who feel confident enough to bet on their own answer for
treatment 1 is to be higher than for treatment 2. And if the relative knowledge about
intermediate events follows H2, the proportion of individuals who feel confident enough
to bet on their own answer for treatment 2 is to be higher than for treatment 3.
23All models were calculated with heteroskedasticity robust standard errors. The models were also
regressed clustering for each of our 8 sessions, but no significant differences were found.
21
Perceived Knowledge and Ambiguity: An Experimental Study Chapter 1
Table 1.5 shows that the percentage of individuals who chose to bet on their own
answers for each treatment corroborates our hypothesis of a negative effect from distance.
In fact, for treatment 2 the percentages showed a decreasing pattern for all average
familiarity events, which were shown to be in accordance with our first assumption, and
was confirmed by ranksum tests.24 As for treatment 3, the perception of knowledge
regarding the target lottery is lower than for the second lottery on the same treatment,
but higher than the perception shown for the same target in treatment 2, which could
be interpreted as an indication of distance effects.
Table 1.5: Perception of Knowledge as a Percentage of Bets on one’s Own Answer
LF AF2 AF3 HF AF1
T1 2.13 27.66
T2 0 12.12 9.09 3.03
T3 0 33.33 56.67 20.00
NOTE: Percentage of participants that chose to bet on
their own answers over the coin flip per event, per treatment.
Finally, Probit models were used evaluate the probability of a participant choosing
to bet on his own answer. Again, models used dummies for the existence of interme-
diate events (treatments 2 and 3), and of a high-familiarity event (treatment 3), along
with controls for the individual’s risk behavior, as measured by the Gneezy and Potter’s
method. The models complied with the following equation (results on table 1.6).
OwnAswAF1 = α + β1OwnAswLF + β2DIST + β3High Fam+ γRB + 
Here the effects of the baseline lottery are a strong predictor of the results, and so
they are dropped from the analysis.25 Aside from that, distance effects are shown to
be significant and in accordance to our first hypothesis for all models that take it into
24The tests indicated the same level of familiarity for all Average Familiarity events, as well as the
same familiarity for the same event across treatments. Further, Low and Average Familiarity events
were shown to come from different distributions in the knowledge rating scale.
25In this situations, Stata automatically drops the linearly dependent variable(s).
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Table 1.6: Effects of Distance and Intermediate Events for Subjectively Ambiguous
Events’ Lotteries
OwnAswAF1 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
DIST -1.236** -1.248* -1.236** -1.237*
(0.481) (0.506) (0.481) (0.486)
High Fam 1.035* 1.059* 1.035* 1.029*
(0.511) (0.501) (0.509) (0.512)
Risk Behavior 0.006 -0.006 0.002
(0.01) (0.007) (0.005)
Pseudo−R2 0.13 0.14 0.11 0.13 0.09 0.09
Significance: **p < 0.01, and *p < 0.05.
account. However, results regarding the effects of intermediate events seem to signif-
icantly contradict our second hypothesis, supporting the intuition that this effects are
more intricate than initially believed.
According to Damisch, Mussweiler and Plessner (2006) [25], judgments realized over
a string of decisions don’t always happen by contrast. In fact, when an individual faces
sequential decisions two possibilities arise. If framing brings about the differences between
events, than these differences will generate a contrast effect that leads decision makers
to judge the current event based on observed differences with respect to the baseline.
However, if framing brings about existing similarities, an assimilation effect takes place
and the common aspects between events will drive judgment.
In that setting, participants may be viewing the baseline as sufficiently dissimilar
to the average familiarity events, so that facing the highly familiar event could make
them perceive their knowledge about it as being similar to their knowledge about the
target (average familiarity) event. Thus, this assimilation effect would increase in the
willingness to pay for (or bet on) the target on treatment 3 when compared to treatment
2, justifying the pattern observed on the data.
Another possible explanation lies on bounded rationality. A boundedly rational de-
cision maker does not have the power to analyze all possible aspects, parameters and
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alternatives at once. “If attention is rationed, decisions can no longer be predicted sim-
ply by knowing the features of alternatives and desires. Decisions will be affected by the
way decision makers attend (or fail to attend) to particular preferences, alternatives and
consequences.”(Nielsen, 2010, [26] p.31). Therefore, we can argue that the exposure to the
high familiarity event, added to the distance from the baseline, may have “clouded” the
decision makers’ perception of that baseline, making them hold their mind-sets around
more recently visited events.
1.4.3 H3: Intrinsic Vs. Subjective Ambiguity
According to hypothesis H3, although the direction of the effects should be the same
across ambiguity structures, sequential effects should be less pronounced for intrinsically
ambiguous lotteries. In fact, results show non-significant effects for both hypothesis
1 and 2 when ambiguity is intrinsic, but significant ones for subjectively ambiguous
lotteries. Careful observation of the averages and effects shows that bounded rationality
and recency bias can provide a plausible explanation for our results within and across
ambiguity structures.
Nielsen (2010) [26], argued that even though boundedly rational decisions may ap-
proach full rationality, heuristics can distort the decision making process, jeopardizing
the use of past behavior as a predictor for future behavior. Thus, if we believe that
individuals are boundedly rational, the nature of intrinsic ambiguity and the amount
of “extra parameters” to be considered in such cases is likely to strengthen the recency
bias (Fudenberg and Peysakhovich, 2014 [27]; Erev and Haruvy, 2013 [21].), which would
imply a more modest effect from events placed further away, diminishing the sequential
effect of the baseline over the target lottery.
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1.5 Concluding Remarks
A lot has been written about ambiguity aversion, contrast effects, and how these
phenomena can shape choice behavior. Based on the idea that people tend to judge
lotteries according to their level of (perceived) knowledge, which is in turn influenced by
the sequential setting, we performed an experiment to test a few hypothesis regarding
contrast and comparison effects in ambiguous settings.
Our contributions to the literature regard two points. First, the empirical evidence
that perception of knowledge is sensitive to the weight of evidence and limited cognition,
so that an ambiguous chance of error is likely to make individuals more cautious about
their choices, reducing the spread of acceptable options. Our second contribution regards
the way events affect perceived knowledge according to their position on a given string of
choice options. While the first event presented seems to act as an anchor, intermediate
events seem to somehow “un-anchor” the following decisions by widening the spread of
acceptable choices.
Recognizing that ambiguity maybe individual specific - in the sense that fixed proba-
bilities exist, but are unknown to the responder -, or maybe there are no fixed probabilities
- such that no individual can calculate a precise expected utility to the event’s occur-
rence -, we designed an experiment using two questionnaire types, each contemplating one
kind of ambiguity. Our Capitals’ Lottery questionnaire used individual-specific ambiguity
events, here defined as subjective ambiguity ; while the Weather Lotteries questionnaire
referred to future weather events, which’s ambiguity is intricate, and here defined as
intrinsic ambiguity.
Building on the comparison experiments from the existing literature, we tested for
effects of distance and relative familiarity of intermediate events over an individual’s
perception of her own knowledge for both ambiguity structures. Our results showed
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distinct choice patterns for each ambiguity type, which suggests that the lack of specific
probabilities fundamentally affects the flow of knowledge perception.
Moreover, it seems that intrinsic ambiguity tends to enhance recency bias, perhaps
through bounded rationality, reducing the occurrence of large spreads on knowledge
perception of sequential events. Our findings also suggest that distance - here described
as the amount of information visited by the decision maker in between events - has a clear
effect when the decisions involve subjectively ambiguous events, but not so if probabilities
are uncertain. Further, the existence of an intermediate event with a distinct bias from
that of the baseline does not reduce the influence of that baseline over the individuals
knowledge perception. Whether by means of an assimilation effect, or due to boundedly
rational decisions, results indicate that relative knowledge regarding intermediate events
does not simply build on effects from the baseline, supporting the intuition that this
effects are more complex than initially believed.
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What to expect when they are
expecting: The role of expectations
on labor market reciprocity
2.1 Introduction
When firms change workers’ wages, workers tend to respond by changing their effort
level, so as to repay that action. However, most evidence regarding this reciprocal behav-
ior is based on wage changes that are not expected. But if expectations enter individuals’
loss-gain utility, perhaps they may affect perception and effort choices, in which case our
knowledge of the relationship between employers’ choices and employees’ reactions is in-
complete. While a lot has been said about employers’ intentions affecting workers’ effort,
to the best of my knowledge, the role of workers’ expectations about employers’ actions
has not yet been directly addressed.
There is a broad body of literature that discusses workers’ responsive behavior to
firms’ actions (changes on wages) under several different settings (see for example Brandts
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and Charness, 2003 [28]; Charness, 2004 [29]; Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger, 2004 [30];
Cox et al. 2008 [31]). Yet another branch of literature talks about how individuals tend to
smooth reactions to changes when those are expected. The argument is that expectations
will anchor individuals’ loss-gain utility, affecting overall utility and choice behavior (e.g.,
Ko¨szegi and Rabin, 2006 [32]; Ericson and Fuster, 2011 [33]; Heffetz and List, 2014 [34]).
What would then be the role of expectations on labor market reciprocation?
Over the past couple of decades several researchers have argued that, aside from the
standard selfish behavior theory and simple fairness preferences, agents’ actions may also
be driven by a sense of reciprocity to others’ actions. Several papers have been published
modeling the impact of reciprocity on agents’ distributional choices (e.g. Rabin, 1993 [35];
Charness and Rabin, 2002 [36]; Cox, et al., 2008 [31]; Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger, 2004
[30]), while others presented experimental or field evidence regarding that phenomenon
(e.g. Offerman, 2002 [37]; Brandts and Charness, 2003 [28]; Mas, 2006 [38]).
Falk, Fehr and Fischbacher (2008) [39], Offerman (2002) [37], Brandts and Charness
(2003) [28], Gneezy and List (2006) [40], etc. advocated for the role of intentions on
triggering reciprocal actions, pointing out that unfair distributions would be less likely
to generate negative reciprocation when caused by a random mechanism or a neutral
third party. In that sense, not only the final distributions of wealth matter, but also how
an outcome has been effected.
Charness (2004) [29] found experimental evidence that workers are willing to exert
less effort when a decrease in their wages results from a willful move from the firm, than
when it is determined either randomly or by a neutral third party, indicating that agents
are not reacting to the outcome alone, but also to the intentions that bring it about.
Gneezy and List (2006) [40] also found interesting evidence of reciprocal behavior.
Using a couple of field experiments, the authors observed a significant positive impact
on effort driven by reciprocal behavior due to an increase on the proposed earnings of
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the agents “hired”. However, they pointed out that the effort increase was short lived,
holding for about a half of the working period.1
The common factor amongst most papers that discuss reciprocity in the labor market
is that changes in wage are sudden, in the sense that there are no specific expectations
formed prior to realizations. But what if these expectations took place? Ko¨szegi and
Rabin (2006) [32] wrote a model of reference-dependent preferences taking on the idea
of the Prospect Theory’s value function (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979 [11] and 1992
[12]). According to their model, when evaluating any given prospect, individuals take as
a reference point not their status quo, but what they expect will be their outcome.
Based on that model, Ericson and Fuster (2011) [33] point out that that people seem
to be loss averse around their expected outcomes, and that “expectation-based” loss
aversion could compel agents to react to otherwise neutral actions. In that sense, if
workers expect a wage raise, the lack of it may trigger negative reciprocation (drop in
worker effort), while the occurrence of a raise when none was foreseen should yield a
more positive response from workers than if they expected it.
Many authors claim that effects of positive reciprocity are harder to identify than
those of negative reciprocity (see for example Offerman, 2002 [37]; Charness and Rabin,
2002 [36]; Kube et al., 2006 [41]). But what if these effects are largely impacted by
expectations? If reciprocal behavior can be modeled as driven by beliefs about beliefs,
and beliefs are the baseline for expectations, then reciprocity itself should be driven by the
gap between expectations and realizations. In this case, an expected action should yield
no significant reciprocal response, while an unexpected move should yield a reciprocal
response that is increasing with the gap between expectations and realizations. In other
words, it is reasonable to believe that existing expectations will tend to create a new
1On a one day task, the difference in productivity became insignificant after lunch, while on a two
day task, it even showed reversal on the second day.
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basis for a reciprocal move.
I claim that contemporary social standards force into agents a moral sense of “nice-
ness” or fairness, which generates an expectation that overpowers some of the responder’s
need to reciprocate to a generous move by changing her perception of the outcome. Under
this idea, a selfish or unfair move by the sender would be unexpected and thus generate
a strong reaction from the responder, while a nice or fair move would be the natural act
or approach, and so it would trigger a more modest need to reciprocate. However, under
the same reasoning, if the experimental setting reflects/resembles a strategically com-
petitive one, then people may expect others to behave selfishly, and so the expectation
effects would work in a reversed manner, increasing positive reciprocity and diminishing
negative reciprocity.
This is not to say that workers’ expectations are the sole determinant of reciprocal
actions, but that the extent of the workers’ reciprocity could be enhanced or lessened
due to existing expectations. Also, in the presence of expectation about a positive (or
negative) action of the employer, a neutral action could be taken as a negative (positive)
one.
Offerman (2002) [37] found evidence that surprises tend to enhance reciprocal behav-
ior. By means of a questionnaire at the end of a Hot Response Game, the author elicited
the second mover’s feelings about the first mover’s actions and found that an unexpected
action triggers a stronger reciprocal response. Further, he finds that the intensity of a
positive emotion to a helpful act does not depend on intention, but negative emotions
are much more intense when the hurtful act is intentional.
Mas (2006) [38] collected data on wage arbitration and police performance from 255
US cities and found that not only did the fact of losing the wage arbitration process
impact performance; but also, the larger the gap between the desired wage rate and the
realized one, the larger the drop in performance. Mas points out that the correlation
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between performance drop and the gap between desired and realized wages can be seen
as an effect of expectation over effort choice. That is, the drop in performance could be
interpreted as a negative reciprocation despite the “allegedly” positive action (increase
in wage), since that action fell short from policemen’s expectations. However, given the
nature of the wage dispute and arbitration presented in Mas’ paper, there is no clear
reciprocal relationship, since the deciding party (arbiter) is not directly affected by the
change in policemen’s effort choice. Moreover, one should account for the possibility of
the unions to be setting their wage proposal strategically, such that they wouldn’t need
to correspond to policemen’s expectations.
Following that idea, I designed an experiment where expectations regarding wages
are built through clearly announced probabilities, while firms simultaneously make wage
decisions that will be the base for reciprocation, as described Section 2.2. In this ex-
periment, I exogenously manipulated expectations about a wage cut while allowing for
reciprocal response to firms’ behavior, and using fixed wages and productivity-dependent
profits, I measured the workers’ responses to a cut in wages and to a “no-cut scenario”
in situations where that cut was expected, as well as when it was not expected.
The results presented in Section 2.3 are consistent with the notion of reciprocity
and also with the idea that expectations can influence reciprocal behavior. It seems
that expectations influence workers’ judgment of firms’ actions, affecting effort levels and
profits. In fact we find that when wages are intentionally cut by the firm, if the cut was
expected the decrease in workers’ average effort corresponds to half of the decrease which
happens when the cut was not expected. Further, an intentionally granted high wage
when not expected increases workers’ average effort up to 5 times as much as when the
high wage was already expected.
This analysis does not attempt to be final nor exhaustive. Instead I try to recognize
the role of expectations on the reciprocal behavior one observes at the labor market,
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and by doing so bring about the discussion and comparison of the impacts generated by
employer’s actions, and employees’ expectations.
2.2 Experimental Design and Procedures
Following Ericson and Fuster (2011 [33], and also Charness and Levine, 2007 [42]), I
used clearly announced probabilities to build expectations, such that agents might expect
a certain wage, but that it may turn out to be a different one. Yet, given my goals, it
was important that the firms could be held responsible for the final wage received for the
reciprocal act to be carried out for workers. Thus, “states of the world” were randomly
implemented granting firms a chance to choose while still having the odds of a wage cut
somewhat determined.
Participants were 248 undergraduate students from the University of California, Santa
Barbara, recruited by email from the general student population. The sessions were
performed at the EBEL computer lab, using the interface Z-tree (Fischbacher, 2007[43]).
Each session consisted of 3 rounds, composed of 3 stages each, and had between 8 and
16 participants who were randomly sorted into a role (worker or firm), and matched into
groups of 4 (3 workers and one firm) at the beginning of each round.
Each stage had a specific objective. In the first stage, the goal was to set status
quo earnings for both workers and firms. To allow for reciprocation effects, the second
stage aimed to affect the workers’ expectations about wages, and give the firms a choice
about whether to cut wages. Finally, in the third stage the goal was to measure the
workers’ change in effort while controlling for their expectations, the wage realization,
and whether those wages were determined by a firm’s choice.
While workers’ wages in any given stage were fixed, firms’ profits depended on workers’
productivity, on the firms’ own decisions about cutting wages, and on chance. Final
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earnings for all participants were based on their earnings at both working stages (stage 1
and 3) in one of the 3 rounds selected at random. Average earnings per participant were
$14.00 for a 45 minute session.
Sessions started with an overall description of all 3 stages contained in a round,
payment procedures and rules. This overall explanation aimed to inform participants
that firms would have a chance to cut workers’ wages, and workers’ performance affected
firms’ profits. It was also made clear that as stages progressed, more detailed explanations
would be given. Then, all participants were put through a 1.5 minute training round
so they would understand the worker’s task, as well as understand the possibilities of
productivity and profit.2 At the end of the training round, each participant was told
the number of tasks she completed, and what would have been the firm’s profit for that
number of tasks.
Once the training round was over, participants were randomly sorted into workers
and firms, and matched into groups. Then, specific instructions for each stage were
cleared as the experiment progressed. Firms profit at any given round was affected by
the productivity of ONE of its workers selected at random. Each firm learned only how
many tasks were completed by the selected worker, no information about the productivity
of the other workers was made available. Meanwhile, each worker learned only her own
productivity, not being privileged to other workers’ productivities or to the firm’s profit.
The first stage was meant to set a status-quo for the workers’ wages. In that stage,
firms received a 48 “lab dollars” (henceforth, “units”) endowment, with which they had
to pay wages of 12 units to each of its workers, and keep the remaining 12 as a residual
which also entered their profit function. Knowing their fixed wage, workers were given 1.5
minutes to work on the simple task that helped determining the firm’s profit. All firms’
2The training round was only performed once in the beginning of each session. At this point roles
were not yet assigned.
33
What to expect when they are expecting: The role of expectations on labor market reciprocity
Chapter 2
profits were calculated based on the number of tasks performed by the chosen worker in
that group (T), and the residual endowment (R, where R = Endowment − 3 ∗ wage),
according to the following equation: Profit = 1/8 ∗ [R + 4T ].
The second stage started with an explanation of the rules for the third stage, where
the difference in treatments was implemented. In the third stage, the firms’ endowment
was reduced from 48 to 36 units, and the firms were given the choice to either keep paying
12 units wages to all 3 workers and have no residual left (R = 0), or keep 12 units as
residual and cut all workers’ wages down to 8 units each. It was explained that once
firms had made their choices, one of 3 possible states of the world would be determined,
possibly overriding the firm’s wage choice, as shown on Figure 2.1.
Figure 2.1: States of the World for each Treatment.
The difference in treatments rested on the probabilities of each possible state of the
world. In the first state of the world, regardless of the firm’s choice, the wages would
be cut down to 8 units and the firm’s residual would be 12 units; in the second state
of the world, the firm’s choice about wage cuts would be carried out, whatever it was;
and for the third state, regardless of the firm’s choice wages would remain 12 units, and
the residual would drop down to 0. For each session either a favorable or an unfavorable
treatment took place. Notice that for both treatments the probability of the second state
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of the world was 40%, but the probabilities for states of the world 1 and 3 were reversed.3
Once all participants learned about the possible outcomes of stage 3, firms made
their decision on whether to cut wages, and workers were asked about their opinions on
whether they believed firms would choose to cut wages (Willful Cut); and on whether
they believed their wages would be cut, either by firm’s choice or the occurrence of State
1 (Monetary Hurt). The goal of the second stage was to set wage expectations for the
workers, and set up the possibility of reciprocity by having the firms choose the new wage
(in state 2).
Once firms and workers had responded to the questions regarding the third stage,
that stage would take place. For each group a state of the world was determined, work-
ers learned their new wage and whether the firm was responsible for it, and once again
workers performed the simple task, just like in stage 1. After the third stage, participants
were offered one extra dollar (a 2 units flat rate) to answer to a short debriefing ques-
tionnaire, where workers were asked about whether they got the wage they expected and
whether they were disappointed or pleased by it. Meanwhile firms where asked about
their reasons for choosing whether to cut workers’ wages.
Once all participants finished the debriefing, they were re-sorted into roles (firm or
worker), and re-matched into new groups to play the game again. Each participant played
the game 3 times (3 rounds), and at the end of the third round, each participant answered
a short demographics questionnaire, learned which round was chosen for payment, and
was called to privately collect her earnings.
3The instructions for the Unfavorable treatment are available on appendix A1. The only difference
between treatments’ instructions were the probabilities of states of the world 1 and 3. Everything else,
including examples, were the same.
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2.3 Results
As we generate expectations involving a certain wage, the non-realization of that wage
should represent an unannounced “shock” on wage, and as such reflect the disappoint-
ment (or joy) of an unexpected wage. For example, if you believe that there is less than
a third of a chance that you are going to get a pay cut, getting that pay cut should be
seen as a somewhat unexpected negative shock. If in the other hand you believe you’re
going to get the pay cut, the “no-pay cut scenario” can be seen as a somewhat positive
shock.
In order to understand the reactions and motivations of our participants, the first
step is to make sure that our “state of the world probabilities” yielded the desired ex-
pectations of a favorable and unfavorable treatments. Using the expectations about pay
cuts elicited during the second stage, as shown in Figure 2.2, we can see that even though
the percentages do not reflect statistically reasonable beliefs, they show that participants
subject to the unfavorable treatment were more likely to believe they’d get hurt by a pay
cut (henceforth, Monetary Hurt). Taking into account the need for independency, and
considering that previous outcomes may influence agents’ beliefs about the possibility of
a wage cut (willful or not), I use only Round 1 ’s data for that analysis.
All else constant, we should expect to have similar beliefs about firms’ behavior in
both treatments, once the firm stands to gain (or lose) just as much in both treatments.
In such case, we should expect the difference in beliefs to be driven by the states of the
world which impose the wage despite of firms’ choices.
If workers’ beliefs about being affected by wage cuts were to be statistically consistent
with the difference in the states of the world probability, we’d stand to find beliefs about
wage cuts to be 40% higher on the Unfavorable Treatment.
The difference in beliefs regarding Monetary Hurt between the two treatments, though
36
What to expect when they are expecting: The role of expectations on labor market reciprocity
Chapter 2
0
.
2
.
4
.
6
.
8
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
Unfavorable Treatment Favorable Treatment
Figure 2.2: Percentage of Workers who Believed they’d suffer Monetary Hurt, by treatment.
smaller than predicted, are supported by an equality of proportions test (Glasnapp and
Poggio, 1985 [44]) at a 5% level (Z = 2.48).
Now, to test how expectations and realizations impact workers reciprocal behavior,
and knowing that different subjects would have different productivity levels, we focused
on the difference in effort exerted by the worker between the first and the last stages
of each round, from here on referred to as effort-increase. Several parametric and non-
parametric tests were performed, and 3 separate analysis were carried out, one focusing
on expectations and holding realizations constant; one focusing on the realizations and
holding the expectations constant; and a more comprehensive analysis, as follows.
2.3.1 Effect of Expectations on Reciprocal Behavior
The first step in the analysis was to hold the realizations (final wage) constant, and
analyze the impact of the difference in expectations, yielded by the two treatment con-
ditions, on the workers effort level.
The numbers on Table 2.1 indicate that an intentionally granted high wage (wage =
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Table 2.1: Statistics for effort increase when wage = 12 units
Unfav. Treatment Fav. Treatment
Range of effort-increase (-3, 7) (-6, 9)
Intentional Median 1 0
Mean 1.595 0.333
Std. Err. (0.359) (0.376)
Range of effort-increase (-11, 6) (-17, 6)
Non Intentional Median 0 0
Mean -0.354 0.152
Std. Err. (0.486) (0.354)
12 units) will increase effort more than a randomly granted one, only when in the un-
favorable treatment (E[wage] = $8 units). The same result is confirmed by Ranksum
and Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests (henceforth K-S) at a 5% level, where the distribution
of effort-increase is significantly different for the presence of intention for the unfavor-
able treatment (pRS = .003, pKS = .010), but not for the favorable one (pRS = .733,
pKS = .980). Further, a first order stochastic dominance test indicated that, for a wage
of 12 on the Unfavorable Treatment, the distribution of effort increase is significantly
higher when the wage was chosen intentionally (pKS = .008).
4
Table 2.2: Statistics for effort increase when wage = 8 units
Unfav. Treatment Fav. Treatment
Range of effort-increase (-29, 8) (-24, 9)
Intentional Median -1 -1
Mean -3.561 -2.063
Std. Err. (1.093) (0.800)
Range of effort-increase (-28, 10) (-15, 9)
Non Intentional Median 0.5 -1
Mean -0.640 -0.641
Std. Err. (0.507) (0.788)
When analyzing the data for the lower wage realization (wage = 8 units), results
indicate that a low wage will not be punished when it was not intentional, especially if
4Graphs on the distributions of effort increase for each case - Wage/Treatment/Intentions - are
available on appendix A2.
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already expected (unfavorable treatment) (Table 2.2). Ranksum and K-S tests confirm
that the distribution of effort-increase (decrease in this case) was only affected by inten-
tionality when low wages were already expected (pRS = .041, pKS = .010). That is, when
in the favorable treatment a low wage made workers decrease their effort regardless of it
being intentional (pRS = .384, pKS = .822). Also, a first order stochastic dominance test
indicated that, for a wage of 8 on the Unfavorable Treatment, the distribution of effort
increase was more negative when wages were intentional (p = .005).5
Finally, diff-in-diff model regressions were analyzed for both realization cases (wage =
12 and wage = 8 units), separately, with the intent to evaluate the impact of expectations
on worker effort, holding the realizations constant. The base model was:
Eff Inci = α+β0Fav Treati+β1Intenti+γ0Fav Treati ∗Intenti+ψRoundi+δXi+i
Where Eff Inc stands for difference between number of tasks completed by the
worker on stage 3 and stage 1; Fav Treat is a dummy that identifies the favorable
treatment (E[wage] = 12); Intent is a dummy for wages intentionally determined by the
firm (State of World = 2); X is a vector of controls;6 and Round is a vector of dummies
for our 3 rounds.
Notice that, for the high wage realization (Table 2.3), despite the fact that being in
the favorable treatment alone did not present any significant changes to workers’ effort-
increase, the positive effect from an intentional move of the firm in keeping the wage at
12 units in stage 3 (Intent) seems to be mostly offset when a high wage was expected
(favorable treatment). In fact, a Wald test could not reject the hypothesis that the
coefficients for Intent and High Wage ∗ Intent cancel out (p− values > 0.609).
5Distributions on the Appendix.
6Controls were: the number of tasks completed by the worker on the training round; age; sex; race;
major (econ or non-econ); participation in previous experiments.
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Table 2.3: Effort Increase with a High Wage Realization
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Fav Treat .0565 .3814 .3867 .5097
(.4305) (.4215) (.4201) (.4134)
Intent 1.9494*** 1.9734*** 1.9846*** 1.9984***
(.3841) (.5037) (.5026) (.5573)
Fav Treat*Intent -1.7685*** -1.6902** -1.7055*** -1.7969***
(.4824) (.5786) (.5613) (.5991)
Round No Yes Yes Yes
Training No No Yes Yes
Demographics No No No Yes
R2 0.03 0.05 0.05 0.09
Significance: ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1.
Notes: N = 264. Standard errors were clustered on Session, but when
clustering on Subjects significances remained roughly the same.
In sum, though the firms’ intentions matter despite treatment, when under a favorable
treatment, the effect of a high wage over productivity was diminished by the expectation
of a high wage. This is consistent with the idea that a positive surprise enhances the
reciprocal effort.
Table 2.4: Effort Increase with a Low Wage Realization
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Fav Treat -.0007 .0529 .3240 .2460
(.9633) (.9851) (.9969) (.9715)
Intent -2.9211* -3.0789* -3.0313* -2.8940**
(1.4056) (1.5402) (1.5623) (1.3209)
Fav Treat*Intent 1.4986 1.3874 1.0196 1.0344
(1.8884) (2.0067) (2.0338) (1.8702)
Round No Yes Yes Yes
Training No No Yes Yes
Demographics No No No Yes
R2 0.03 0.06 0.07 0.14
Significance: ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1.
Notes: N = 273. Standard errors were clustered on Session, but when clustering
on Subjects, variables significant at 10% become significant at a 5% level.
In the other hand, when the wage realizations were low (Table 2.4), a firm’s active
choice yielded a drop in effort regardless of the treatment to which participants were
40
What to expect when they are expecting: The role of expectations on labor market reciprocity
Chapter 2
subject. That is, regardless of workers’ expectations, an intentional cut in wages yielded
a drop in effort, indicating that an intentionally negative action will be reciprocated
despite expectations.
2.3.2 Effect of Realizations on Reciprocal Behavior
On this step of our analysis, expectations were held constant (separate analysis of each
treatment) and our focus was to evaluate reciprocity for each possible wage realization.
If we refer back to the statistics on the previous sub-section, we can observe that inten-
tionality plays a role in determining workers effort change on the unfavorable treatment.
The same results are corroborated by Ranksum tests, which significantly distinguishes the
distributions of effort-increase (or decrease) when the third stage wage is determined by
the firm, from the randomly determined one, for both realizations (wage = 12, p = .0031;
and wage = 8, p = .0413).
In the other hand, when the treatment was favorable (subjects should expect a high
wage), firms’ intentions barely played a role. If we observe the medians for effort-increase
(alt. decrease), we notice that they are no different for a given wage, again a result
corroborated by Ranksum tests (wage = 12, p = .7326; and wage = 8, p = .3835).
Further, for our favorable treatment, the Ranksum test cannot reject the equality between
distribution of effort-increase across wages when there is no intention (p = .3304), and
just marginally rejects it when wages are determined by firms’ choices (p = .0602).
Again we analyzed diff-in-diff models, this time holding expectations (treatments)
constant. The regressions complied with the following model (results on Table 2.5:
Eff Inci = α+β0High Wagei+β1Intenti+γ0High Wagei∗Intenti+ψRoundi+δXi+i
Where most variables are define as in section 2.3.1, and High Wage is a dummy that
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identifies the realization of a high wage (wage = 12 units).
Table 2.5: Effort Increase for the Unfavorable Treatment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
High Wage .2862 .2230 .1938 .0925
(.9915) (.9907) (1.0188) (1.1569)
Intent -2.9211* -2.9670 -2.9382 -2.9217*
(1.4581) (1.6668) (1.6865) (1.5173)
High Wage*Intent 4.8705* 4.6765** 4.5294** 4.7139**
(1.3430) (1.5156) (1.5187) (1.2545)
Round No Yes Yes Yes
Training No No Yes Yes
Demographics No No No Yes
R2 0.08 0.10 0.10 0.15
Significance: ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1.
Notes: N = 261. Standard errors were clustered on Session. When
clustering on Subjects, significance levels of 5% were found for
“Intent”, and of 1% for “High Wage*Intent” on all models.
In all models studied, when under an unfavorable treatment workers relied on firm’s
intention to reciprocate. When final wages were high (High Wage = 1), the difference in
effort seems to be higher if wages were determined by a firm’s choice; and when wages were
low (High Wage = 0), difference in effort seems to be lower when the cut was intentional.
Also, a Wald test rejected the hypothesis of equality between the two coefficients (Intent
and High Wage ∗ Intent), further indicating the effect of an intentionally granted high
wage.
In sum, the results indicate that even when a low wage is expected, an intentional
wage cut can reduce workers’ effort, while an intentional non-cut will increase that effort.
In the other hand, just as our previous test indicated, when under the favorable
treatment intentions did not play a role (Table 2.6). A result which indicates that when
expecting a high wage, workers respond less to the employer’s intention, and feel less
inclined to reciprocate to a high wage.
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Table 2.6: Effort Increase for the Favorable Treatment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
High Wage .7934 .5767 .4042 .9690
(.5807) (.6288) (.6586) (.7069)
Intent -1.4225 -1.5535 -1.6890 -1.0771
(1.2896) (1.4514) (1.4923) (1.4657)
High Wage*Intent 1.6034 1.8570 2.0225 1.4043
(1.4532) (1.6060) (1.6420) (1.5363)
Round No Yes Yes Yes
Training No No Yes Yes
Demographics No No No Yes
R2 0.04 0.06 0.06 0.12
Significance: ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1.
Notes: N = 276. Standard errors were clustered on Session, but when clustering
on Subjects, no differences were observed on significance levels.
2.3.3 Net Effect of Expectations on Reciprocal Behavior
Finally, in order to analyze the net effect of expectations and realizations we used the
following regression model:
Eff Inci = α+β0Fav Treati+β1High Wagei+β2Intenti+γ0Fav Treati∗High Wagei+
+γ1Fav Treati∗Intenti+γ2High Wagei∗Intenti+υ0Fav Treati∗High Wagei∗Intenti+
+ψRoundi + δXi + i
Where all variables are as previously defined.
Observe that intentions have a significant negative impact for all models evaluated
(Table 2.7). However, that decrease in effort is more than compensated by the increase
which happens when the wage granted intentionally is high (High Wage∗Intent). Also,
for our first regression (1), the effect of the intentional high wage seems to be diminished
when workers expected to get the high wage in the first place (Fav Treat∗High Wage∗
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Table 2.7: Net Effect of Expectations and Realizations on Effort Increase
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Fav Treat -.0007 .1092 .2472 .0830
(.9627) (.9773) (.9686) (.9471)
High Wage .2862 .2768 .2538 .1710
(.9551) (.9773) (.9992) (1.1221)
Intent -2.9211* -2.8888* -2.8641* -2.8512*
(1.4046) (1.5366) (1.5485) (1.4067)
Fav Treat*High Wage .5072 .3049 .1206 .2792
(1.1110) (1.1125) (1.1315) (1.2858)
Fav Treat*Intent 1.4986 1.3140 1.1261 1.3099
(1.8871) (2.0344) (2.0532) (1.9602)
High Wage*Intent 4.8705*** 4.6469*** 4.5256*** 4.6754***
(1.2937) (1.4133) (1.4166) (1.2223)
Fav Treat*High Wage*Intent -3.2670* -2.7776 -2.4577 -2.6494
(1.9210) (2.0733) (2.0884) (1.8742)
Round No Yes Yes Yes
Training No No Yes Yes
Demographics No No No Yes
R2 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.12
Significance: ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1.
Notes: N = 537. Standard errors were clustered on Session. When clustering
on subjects, the variable Intent became significant at a 5% level.
Intent). Once again, the cancellation of coefficients is corroborated by a Wald test,
which cannot reject that the sum of the coefficients for Intent, High Wage ∗ Intent and
Fav Treat ∗High Wage ∗ Intent is zero (p− value = 0.518).7
Further, intentionally low wages tend to reduce worker effort regardless of expecta-
tions (treatment), and non-intentional actions, whether positive or negative, show no
significant effects.
7As a robustness check regressions on each possibility Wage/Treatment/Intentions were run and can
be found on appendix A3.
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2.4 Concluding Discussion
The concept of reciprocity brings up the relevance of intentions and the idea that the
perception of intentions are dependent on expectations formed by the receiver. Thus, a
second mover may deem the same action either nice or hurtful, according to her beliefs
about the first movers’ intentions, motivations and justifications.
In our experiment, if a worker is facing a favorable treatment, she is likely to ex-
pect to get a 12 units wage, which should entail a feeling of disappointment in case it
doesn’t happen. But how should we expect her to react to it? According to intentional
reciprocity, she’d react negatively only if the wage cut was due to an intentional move
by the firm. But even then, if she believes that the firm is justified in cutting wages,
she may not decrease her effort as much, deeming the action fair due to external causes.
Further, when in a favorable treatment, if a worker is graced with a high wage (12 units),
even when due to a nice move from the firm, she may feel like that was “no more than
expected”, in which case she may not feel as compelled to reciprocate as she might have
otherwise.
If workers are facing an unfavorable treatment, where they are likely to believe they’ll
get a lower wage (8 units), getting a high wage may be seen as a nice surprise, and they
may feel the urge to reciprocate when it was based on an intentional move from the firm.
Finally, even if workers are expecting to get the lower wage (unfavorable treatment), that
does not necessarily mean they believe the firm will cut wage, even less that they see it
as being justified. Perhaps workers see an intentional cut on wages as the “dissolution”
of their “small chance” on getting a nice wage, and therefore they see it as a hurtful act
that deserves punishing, which entails them to decrease effort.
We found evidence that employees’ expectations can affect their behavior towards
the firms, whether enhancing or reducing effort choices when wages are intentionally
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implemented. Moreover, results indicate that an intentionally hurtful move by the firm
will be reciprocated by workers even when the lower outcome was already expected.
While an intentionally nice move from the firm, when a high outcome is expected, can
be overseen by workers and thus, not reciprocated.
This result agrees with Offerman’s (2002) [37], who points out that the intensity of
a positive emotion to a helpful act does not seem to depend on intentions, but negative
emotions seem much more intense when the hurtful act is seen as intentional, and that
surprises about the first player’s (firm) choice seem to enhance second player’s (worker)
emotions.
Initially I claimed that a nice move should be regarded as socially expected and as
such, it does not entail positive reciprocation, while a hurtful move is usually seen as
deserving of a negative reciprocal action. If this claim can be deemed true, it is easier
to understand the findings (or lack of findings) reported on the literature, where positive
reciprocity is either not found (Charness, 2004 [29]), short lived (Gneezy and List, 2006
[40]) or simply weaker than its negative counterpart (Offerman, 2002 [37]; Charness and
Rabin, 2002 [36]). While negative reciprocity is not only evident, but also resilient (Kube
et al., 2006 [41]).
Despite the fact that the earnings were quite balanced (between workers and firms),
one can claim that there may be some sort of fairness goal involved in a decrease in
effort by a worker when wages are cut. Once a wage cut consists of a third of workers
earnings, it makes sense within the fairness theory that workers would diminish effort by
approximately a third to even out losses, regardless of that cut being intentional. Under
the same theory, if wage cuts did not take place, the lower initial profit for the firms on
stage 3 should stimulate workers to intensify effort to equalize payments once more.
But what would expectations do in such a case? Notice that if the idea is simply to
equalize payoffs, expectations should play no role whatsoever. In fact, neither expecta-
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tions nor intentions should affect workers’ effort choices. Instead, workers should always
react in a way to smooth payments across agents, both firms and workers, taking actions
based solemnly on the third stage wage outcome.
Our data indicates that when firms’ intentions did not affect the end result (wage on
stage 3), workers did not significantly react to it regardless of expectations, once more
defending the idea of reciprocity, as opposed to theories of distributional preferences.
It also suggests that reciprocity is more frequently observed when a lower outcome is
expected, in which case not only a positive surprise yielded a positive reciprocation, but
a negative realization, despite being expected, was negatively reciprocated.
It is important to understand how workers behave in the labor market, and what do
they deem fair; under what situations would they react to a wage cut, and whether a
peek at the market’s current moves would generate an expectation that would help to
justify the firm’s actions, diminishing any possible negative reciprocity. Perhaps when
firms foresee a need to cut wages, it is not a good plan to make workers aware of that
appending need. Perhaps it is best if when that need is established, firms just draw their
best explanation and hope that workers will deem the cut as justified.
One way to try to better understand participants’ behavior and their justifications
for such is to turn to the firms’ debriefings. At the end of each round, they were asked
to state their beliefs about workers reactions to wage cuts, as well as the reasons that led
them to their own choices on whether to cut wages. A quick analysis of those debriefings
reveled concerns with fairness, kindness and efficiency. Also, some firms realized that
workers’ feelings of frustration could make workers diminish their effort such that firms’
profit would be even lower with wage cuts; and some stated to hope for State of World
to be 1, so that they could keep the residual and avoid the blame.
Finally, it is important to bear in mind that our design did not allow us to establish
whether workers believed that the wage cut was justified. A possibility which arises
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because the endowment is reduced on stage 3, which can characterize a hardship on the
firms. According to Charness and Levine (2007) [42], perceptions of fairness regarding
identical actions will differ depending upon circumstances and justifications to one’s
actions. If we believe that workers deemed a wage cut, in any level, as a fair move on
the firms part, than we should expect that the reciprocal effects would be lessened and
our results should represent an even stronger reaction than initially believed.
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Chapter 3
Advertising and Enjoyment: The
Case of a Short Movie
3.1 Introduction
Have you ever gone to a movie on a whim, without information or expectation, and
then found yourself enjoying all the surprises that could’ve otherwise been ruined by
scenes on trailers? Have you ever seen a trailer so good, that made you write the movie
opening in your calendar, and then when the movie came on you were disappointed?
Have you ever watched those movies again only to find out that the latter was actually
better than the former? Have you ever questioned whether you should keep watching
trailers?
Initially based on still images from upcoming attractions, movie trailers are as old as
the movie industry itself (Buehler et al., 2008) [45], and today they are the main channel
through which audiences learn about new movies. According to Oliver et al (2007) [46]
movie previews play an important role in entertainment-selection decisions. Faber and
O’Guinn (1984) [47] say consumers have rated trailers as the most useful, important and
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influential source for movie choice.
Over the past decade the number of tickets sold in box offices fell about 16%, while
the number of movies released has increased in about 30% (Lepore, 2014 [48]). Know-
ing the box office is still considered the thermometer for a movie’s success; the greater
competition brings producers and studios to “employ emotional branding to hype the
movies for a significant period of time prior to its release” (Stapleton and Hughes, 2005
[49], p.23).
Recent literature in marketing and psychology have concentrated some effort in study-
ing movie trailers, including how they impact viewers’ anticipated enjoyment and how
do new technologies such as interactive trailers, and even the online streaming of trail-
ers affect box office openings (see for example: Xie and Lee, 2004 [50]; Buehler et al,
2008 [45]; Oh, Chung and Han, 2014 [51]; Jensen, 2014 [52]). The importance of these
questions is evident when we observe that the US movie industry is a $100 billion dollar
industry, counting the receipts not only from box office, but mostly all the subsequent
franchise markets (Stapleton and Hughes, 2005 [49]).
However, according to Stapleton and Hughes (2005) [49], about 90% of the revenue
from the movie industry is driven by rentals, media sales, games, merchandise, licensing,
etc. The authors claim that “the power of the movie to romance the story creates deep
and fond memories for audiences, bonding them to almost anything associated with that
entertainment franchise brand, which in turn sells everything from games to breakfast
cereal.” (p. 24)
But if the main source of revenue for this industry comes from franchise products
other than the movie itself, it is important to look past the box office and analyze what
are the exogenous factors that affect movie enjoyment, and particularly how do trailers
impact the viewers final enjoyment.
Many factors may influence a viewers enjoyment of a movie, some more intuitive
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than others. Amongst them we may quote exogenous factors such as expectations, level
of attention, arousal, etc. and some endogenous ones such as the movie’s plot, genre,
technological and overall quality of the movie.
Geers and Lassiter (1999) [53] performed a 2X2 experiment where they analyzed
the effect of the level of attention (gross-attention vs. fine-attention) and expectations
(high-expectation vs. no-expectation) on subjects’ judgment of a movie. Their results
showed that when individuals were highly attentive (fine-attention) to the movie, high
expectations yielded a lower level of enjoyment. But when attention was low (gross-
attention) high expectations yielded an assimilation effect and consequently a higher
level of enjoyment. Perhaps the lack of proper incentive-compatible mechanisms, jointly
with the wording of the instructions may have discouraged participants to pay attention
all together, possibly confounding the results.1 The authors argue that in being more
attentive, participants were more apt to notice discrepancies between their expectations
and the outcome.
Several other authors have analyzed movie enjoyment under different lenses, such as
the viewer’s mood (Eliashberg and Sawhney, 1994 [54]); interactive introspection and
identification with characters or plot (Batat and Wohlfeil, 2009 [55]; Cohen, 2001 [56];
Green, Brock and Kaufman, 2004 [57]). According to Oliver et al (2007) [46], viewers
experience gratification from the success of protagonist characters or the failure of the
disliked characters. Therefore, in order to generate anticipated enjoyment, and thus be
appealing to prospective viewers, trailers are produced not just to give an overview of
the film, but to sell it (Garret, 2012 [58]). But how does trailer viewing impact on movie
enjoyment?
1Instructions for the gross-attention group asked participants to “segment the [character’s] behavior
into the largest actions that are meaningful to you”. The examples given were made it clear that “actions”
could describe steps taken, or the intended final action, in such a way that the individual did not need
to pay attention to details and perhaps not fully understand the video.
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On a brief online search about movie trailers and enjoyment, one would observe that
several bloggers advise against watching trailers.2 Among the reasons why “trailers are
ruining movies” they mention that trailers tend to show the best action pieces and jokes,
give away the story, or even completely misrepresent the plot, such that the viewer may
get something entirely different from what she expected (McBeth, 2014 [59]).
In this paper I used a lab experiment to study the impact of a movie trailer on the
enjoyment of a short movie. My initial hypothesis is that when the subjects are exposed
to a movie trailer, they acquire some information about the movie which may raise their
expectations, generate anticipated enjoyment, and perhaps lessen their actual enjoyment
of the movie. In other words:
Hypothesis: Watching a movie trailer may reduce the enjoyment of the movie
itself.
The experiment involved 2 groups (Treatment and Control), both of which were
exposed to the same information about the short movie in different ways. The Treatment
group experience a movie advertising interview and a trailer, and the Control was exposed
to the same information by means of a written paragraph.
Results showed that the average enjoyment for was higher for the Control group. In
fact, on average, the difference between individuals’ predicted and realized enjoyments
(before and after watching the movie) was twice as much for the Control group than for
the Treatment group.
In the next section, I describe the experimental design and procedures, followed by
detailed results and the conclusions.
2Amongst the links you may find: http://blog.contv.com/are-movie-trailers-ruining-your-
enjoyment-of-movies/; http://www.kotaku.com.au/2014/11/idea-stop-watching-movie-trailers/;
http://metro.co.uk/2014/11/15/5-reasons-why-trailers-are-ruining-movies-4941834/; etc.
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3.2 Experimental Design and Procedures
The subjects were 87 undergraduate students from the University of California, Santa
Barbara, who were recruited from the general student pool. The experiment was per-
formed using paper questionnaires and a projection screen for both the movie and the
information that preceded it.
For both treatments, sessions lasted about 30 minutes. A total of 6 sessions were
performed, and the average earnings of a participant were US$8.20. The experiment
involved the judging of the Oscar nominated short live action movie, Boogaloo and
Graham, by Ronan Blaney and Michael Lennox. Set in 1970’s Belfast, the movie tells
the story of 2 boys whose father gives them 2 chickens to raise. The birds become all
the kids care about while the trouble and mayhem is breaking up all around them. The
director claims that the idea was to use the military scenario of the time to introduce a
theme he describes as “universal in any conflict”, which are real life and family conflicts
that happen behind closed doors.
For all participants the experiment consisted of an initial exposure to some infor-
mation about the movie (producer, director, storyline, prizes and praises),3 followed by
a couple of questions about their own impressions, and what they believed the other
participants thought of it. As shown below:
1. How much is the genre of the movie (Comedy/Drama) appealing to you? [scale
1-5]
2. Consider the following statement: “I think this will be a really good movie.”, and
the scale [1 (Strongly Disagree) - 5 (Strongly Agree)]: On average, how many
3the information that was shared with both groups can be seen as a positive propaganda of the movie,
which would normally stimulate prospective viewers into actually watching the movie. In a real world
setting this information can be compared to billboard signs, or casually shared information.
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participants, out of the [NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS IN THE SESSION] people
in the room, do you believe would strongly agree (5) with the statement?
Once the questionnaires were collected, participants were invited to watch the movie
and to answer a similar questionnaire about their impressions, and what they believed
the other participants thought of it, only this time with the knowledge of the actual
movie. As shown below:
1. Have you ever watched this movie before today? [Yes - No]
2. Consider the following statement: “I think this was a really good movie.”, and
the scale [1 (Strongly Disagree) - 5 (Strongly Agree)]: On average, how many
participants, out of the [NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS IN THE SESSION] people
in the room, do you believe would strongly agree (5) with the statement?
For both questionnaires (before and after the movie) our main interest regarded the
participants’ beliefs about the elicited average opinion. Thus, in other to properly in-
centivize their answers, a quadratic scoring rule was used for payments to incentivize
truthful answers.
Aside from a US$5.00 show up fee, participants earned up to US$2.50 for each of the
two questionnaires based on accuracy about other participants’ opinions, according to
the following equations:
Earnings from Questionnaire = 2.5 ∗ [1− Error2]
where the error was given by:
Error = |AverageGuess−ParticipantsOwnGuess|
AverageGuess
Also, no negative results were allowed. If Error > 1, the participant’s Earnings
for that questionnaire were null. Of all questionnaires, the case of an Error > 1 only
happened twice, and though the payments were defaulted to zero, the actual answers
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were used in the data set. Also, all participants claimed to never having watched the
movie.
If we believe the Quadratic Scoring Rule (QSR) yielded the correct incentives than,
for any one participant, the best response is to be truthful about the number of partici-
pants they believed would truly enjoy the movie. Since participants were not allowed to
communicate with each other, it is reasonable to assume that they would base their guess
on their own personal enjoyment level (predicted or realized) and strategic reasoning.
Since all participants had the same set of incentives, strategic behavior should be
uniform within treatment. That being the case, if we are aware of how does strategic
behavior influence each group (treatment), we should be able to discern the direction
of its effects. Thus, we here use (and henceforth refer to) the elicited “average number
of participants who’d qualify the movie as a 5 out of 5” as the participants’ “Average
Enjoyment” (predicted or realized). One may perhaps point out that a QSR is not
immune to risk averse behavior. However, risk aversion would have participants to skew
their choices towards the midpoint, which would not be confounding to our results.
Further, to understand the effect of advertisement, a treatment and a control group
were used. For the Advertisement group I used a short interview with the Director and
the Producer of the movie in addition to a short trailer, and for the Control group the
same information was conveyed by the means of a written paragraph that was displayed
and read out loud to the participants, minimizing the advertisement’s effect without
compromising equality of information. Finally, simple demographics were collected to be
used as controls; these were: gender, age, major and race.
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3.3 Results
If we believe that watching the movie trailer (Treatment group) should yield a lower
enjoyment, than we should expect that the average number of participants who believed
the movie was going to be “really good” (5 out of 5 on the scale) should be greater for
the participants who were in the Control group.
In fact, as we can observe on table 3.1, the elicited average number of participants
to classify the movie as a 5 out of 5 was higher for the control group after participants
actually watched the movie.
Table 3.1: Elicited Average Enjoyment
Predicted Realized
Treatment (N = 41) 6.439 8.220
(.486) (.567)
Control (N = 46) 6.913 10.543
(.639) (.674)
Ranksum and Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests corroborated our results, rejecting the equal-
ity across treatments after subjects watched the movie (average realized enjoyment) with
p− values of: pR = .011 and pKS = .055.
One may observe that the elicited averages on predicted enjoyment indicate that there
were no differences in expectations generated by the trailer. However, existing literature
gives us reason to speculate on whether there was an influence of latent expectations on
strategic behavior, as follows.
Rustro¨m and Wilcox (2009) [60] performed an experiment in which they found that
belief elicitation affects strategic choice actions. According to the authors, when directly
asked about one’s own beliefs, individuals tend to enter into a more deliberative consid-
eration, moving away from their “affective” predispositions. In such case, it makes sense
that individuals would strategically skew their “predicted enjoyment averages” towards
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the midpoint, as to increase chances of a better payout. Such behavior should tend to
draw the predicted enjoyment down for the Treatment group, and up for the Control
group. Further, the elicited average realized enjoyment should also move towards the
midpoint, which in this case would not affect the gap between treatments.
Another possible reason to speculate about expectations is discussed by Atlas and
Wager (2013) [61], who explain that individuals try to keep their expectations “under
control” to avoid disappointments. In that case, individuals in the Treatment group may
have reported a lower level of predicted enjoyment as means to convince themselves not
to expect much from the movie. In this case, the only incentive to misreport would be
on the prediction for the Treatment group, whose true value would have been purposely
under reported.
All in all, assuming that strategic reasoning does not confound our results, I evaluated
the gap between the average enjoyment before and after the movie.4 The so called Dif-
ference in Enjoyment, corresponds to the “average realized enjoyment (after the movie)”
minus the “average predicted enjoyment (before)” of each participant. The statistics on
Difference in Enjoyment are reported on table 3.2.
Table 3.2: Statistics for Difference in Enjoyment
Control Treatment
Mean 3.630 1.780
Std. Errors (.578) (.444)
Median 3.5 1
Observe that the gap on enjoyment is significantly greater for the Control group, a
result again corroborated by Ranksum and Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests, which rejected
the equality of the gap between reported enjoyments with p− values of: pR = .004 and
pKS = .001.
4If one believes that latent expectations play a role, then our results should in fact be strengthened.
57
Advertising and Enjoyment: The Case of a Short Movie Chapter 3
I also counted the number of participants who stated that the movie would be qualified
as a “5 out of 5” by more than 30% of their peers, before and after watching it (Table
3.3).
Table 3.3: Participants who Stated that more than 30% of Peers would Qualify the
Movie as a 5
More than 30% Percentage
Control Before 27 58.7
(n=46) After 43 93.5
Treatment Before 28 68.3
(n=41) After 34 82.9
Notes: The counting was made considering the number of participants
in each session to ensure the correct proportionality of 30%.
Notice that after watching the trailer, but before the movie, roughly 10% more par-
ticipants believed in a high rating of the movie on the Treatment group. However, after
watching the movie, the number of participants who believed that his peers would highly
enjoy the movie were almost 10% higher for the Control group.
Now, recall that our focal question asked “On average, how many participants, out
of the [number of participants in the session] people in the room, do you believe would
strongly agree with the statement ‘I think this was a really good movie’.” Table 3.4
analyses what factors influenced participants’ answers considering treatment, predicted
enjoyment, and controls, as well as a variable regarding how appealing participants con-
sidered the movie’s genre.5
As expected, the realized enjoyment, was positive and significantly dependent on the
predicted enjoyment. Further, all regressions indicate that the advertisement (Treat-
ment) group yielded a negative effect, confirming our hypothesis that the trailer would
negatively affect enjoyment.
5Recall we asked participants to rate on a 1-5 scale how appealing the genre of the movie was to
them. Appeal is a dummy variable that assumed value 1 when the participant claimed a high appeal (4
or 5 out of 5), and zero otherwise, aiming to control for what would be an individual-based determinant.
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Table 3.4: Regressions for Realized Enjoyment
(1) (2) (3)
Pred Enjoym .683*** .625*** .555***
(.099) (.108) (.116)
Trailer -2.000*** -1.913*** -2.145***
(.685) (.681) (.732)
Appeal 1.419* 1.895*
(.776) (.964)
Demographics No No Yes
R2 0.44 0.46 0.55
Significance: ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1.
Notes: N = 87 and robust standard errors. When clustering
on subjects no significant changes were observed.
Finally, I tested for the effect of the trailer on the gap between elicited enjoyment (pre-
dicted and realized). Table 3.5 reflects the regression in levels, and once again presents
the Treatment as a negative and significant contributor to the participants’ relative en-
joyment of the movie. The advertisement negatively affected the gap, which indicates
that participants who were exposed to the trailer had a less enjoyable experience than
those in the Control group.
Table 3.5: Regressions on Difference in Enjoyment
(1) (2) (3)
Trailer -1.850** -1.821** -2.143***
(.729) (.739) (.797)
Appeal .359 .359
(.787) (.834)
Demographics No No Yes
R2 0.07 0.07 0.19
Significance: ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1.
Notes: N = 87 and robust standard errors.
Figures 3.1 and 3.2 show the density distributions for predicted and realized enjoy-
ments for each treatment. Notice that for the Control group, the predicted enjoyment
is more spread and its distribution is set around 7, while for the Treatment group, it
is more concentrated with a longer tail towards higher values. As for the realized en-
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joyment, while not much change is observed for the treated group, the control group’s
distribution for realized enjoyment is clearly skewed to the right, now centered on 10.
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Figure 3.1: Density of Predicted and Realized Enjoyment for the Treatment Group
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Figure 3.2: Density of Predicted and Realized Enjoyment for the Control Group
Figure 3.3 shows the density for the difference in enjoyment for each treatment. Notice
that despite the fact that both distributions are centered on close values, while for the
Treatment group the distribution is more dense to the left, for the Control group it is
more dense to the right, indicating a greater gap in enjoyment (and a higher relative
enjoyment) for the latter.
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Figure 3.3: Density of Difference in Elicited Enjoyment
3.4 Conclusion
This paper discussed the effect of trailers on movie enjoyment. The idea is that trailers
may raise their viewers’ expectations about a movie, generate anticipated enjoyment, and
perhaps lessen their actual enjoyment of the movie.
To test this hypothesis, I performed an experiment using a short, Oscar nominated,
live action movie (Boogaloo and Graham). In this experiment participants were divided
into two groups. The Treatment group started by watching a short interview with the
movie’s director and producer, and a short trailer. The Control group, in the other hand,
received the same information about the movie, but via a simple paragraph which was
displayed and read out loud by the experimenter. Following, both groups were questioned
about what they predicted would be the average enjoyment of the movie. Afterwards,
both groups watched the movie, and reported what they believed to be the average
realized enjoyment.
Results showed that the Treatment group enjoyed the movie significantly less than the
Control group, indicating that the trailer did indeed affect individual’s judgement and
enjoyment of the movie. In fact, on average the Control group reported a difference in
enjoyment (realized - predicted) that was twice as high as that reported by the Treatment
group.
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Also, regressions showed that realized enjoyment was significantly and negatively
affected by the advertisement, as was the difference in enjoyment both in levels, and as a
percentage of the number of participants. Further, the distributions where shown to be
centered on a higher level of realized enjoyment for the Control group. It is interesting to
observe that despite the fact that the trailer yielded insignificant results on the elicited
expectations (predicted enjoyment), it still significantly reduced the realized enjoyment,
increasing the gap between expected and realized enjoyment of the movie.
Despite the fact that expectations didn’t seem to be affected by my Advertisement
treatment, I speculate that trailers and other forms of movie promotion may affect
prospective viewers’ expectations. And the higher are one’s expectations the more likely
she is to experience some level of disappointment.6 And, in affecting ones enjoyment,
expectations can influence future choices by affecting utility maximizing behavior.
The danger in generating disappointment for a particular picture is not as big as
the danger of spillover through recognizable names, such as leading actors, directors
and producers. It is not uncommon to hear an statement such as “I like Jonny Depp’s
movies!”, or “Quentin Tarantino is great!”. But just as those comments generalize the
idea of a good characteristic of a certain group of movies, a significant disappointment
may generate comments which may be detrimental to a whole class of movies, such as
“Katherine Heigl movies are always the same”.
It is important to exploit the individuals anticipated enjoyment to convince the audi-
ence to go the theaters, and start moving the wheels of enjoyment and recognition which
will, later, boost the sales and the positive impacts. But it is essential to understand the
what are the factors that affect enjoyment, and what are the mechanisms that take effect
6According to Bell (1985) [62], disappointment is a psychological reaction to an outcome that falls
short of one’s expectations such that the greater the disparity, the greater the disappointment. Therefore,
forming expectations about a movie may skew the viewer’s final judgment about it and, in some cases,
even generate disappointment (or elation).
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in this process. The more we understand about how choices are made, the more we can
understand what incentives are necessary, how to build them and what is their efficient
level.
The movie industry is a multi-billion dollar enterprise which directly and indirectly
affects multiple industries and markets across the world. According to Roos (2009) a
common rule of thumb for marketing is to devote one third of the total movie budget to
it, which on average of $35 million in 2009. To make sure this investment does not back-
fire (by reducing overall revenue) can help increase and fortify this industry, bringing the
positive impacts to the economy as a whole.
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Appendix Chapter 2
A.1 Experiment’s Instructions
INITIAL INSTRUCTIONS
Thank you for participating today!
You will be paid for your participation in cash and privately at the end of the exper-
iment. What you earn may depend on decisions (yours or of others) and on chance. At
this point, please turn off all electronic devices.
The entire experiment will take place through the computer and there should be
no interaction with participants seated at other computers. If at any point you have
a question, please do not hesitate to raise your hand, and I will be by to answer your
question.
Please do not talk or in any way try to communicate with other participants during
the experiment.
We’ll start by going over general instructions about payments and tasks throughout
a round. These will be followed by a training after which more specific instructions will
be given before each actual stage.
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GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS
At the beginning of each round you will be randomly assigned into a group of 4
participants, where one participant will play the role of the firm and the other 3 will be
the workers for that firm.
Each round will consist of 3 stages. The workers’ wages for the first stage are
determined by the experimenter, but during the second stage firms will make
decisions that may influence third stage wages, as we’ll see momentarily.
The firms’ profits will be determined by the firm’s decision in the second
stage (when applicable) and the productivity of ONE of its 3 workers to be
chosen at random. Each worker will have an equal chance in determining firm’s profit at
any working stage.
Workers will earn fixed (of either 12 or 8 lab dollars) that will be revealed prior to
each working stage (stage 1 and 3). Firms will earn profits according to the equation:
Profits = 1/8*[R + 4*T], where R is the residual endowment (= endowment - wages),
and R = 12 or zero; and T is the number of tasks completed by the chosen worker. So if
R = 12, the firm will receive 12/8 + 4T/8 = 3/2 + T/2; if R = 0, the firm will receive
4T/8 = T/2.
In sum, workers can influence firm’s profit at both working stages, while
firms have a chance to cut worker’s wages for the second working stage.
Workers’ productivity and firms’ final earnings will be private. Workers will learn
their wage and whether it was determined by a firm’s choice, but no worker will ever
learn other workers’ performance nor the firm’s final earnings. Firms will only observe
the performance of the chosen worker, which directly determines her earnings, but it will
not learn the worker’s ID, nor the other workers’ productivities.
Final earnings for the experiment will be given by your earnings on both working
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stages for one of the 3 rounds to be chosen at random, plus 2 lab dollars for each
debriefing questionnaire answered. Workers will answer the questionnaire through the
computer, while firms are to answer it on paper.
Lab dollars will be converted to US dollars in a rate of 2-to-1, that is: 2
lab dollars = 1 USD.
TASK INSTRUCTIONS
Once the time starts, on the left hand side of the screen, you will be given a grid
where each letter of the alphabet is associated to a number. In the center of the screen,
you will be given a box containing a letter and a space where you are asked to type in the
corresponding number. Look up the letter on the grid, type the number that corresponds
to it, and click “OK”.
Each number correctly entered will count as one completed task. If you enter the
wrong number, a pop up will let you know. In which case you should click “OK” on it,
and proceed with the task. At the right hand side of the screen, the number of correct
answers will be continually displayed.
You will have 1.5 minutes to go about your task. When the time is up, the screen
will display the number of tasks you completed, and what would be the firm’s profit
considering residual endowments (R) of both 12 and zero lab dollars.
FIRST STAGE INSTRUCTIONS
In this stage, firms will receive an initial endowment of 48 lab dollars. Each firm will
use this endowment to pay a mandatory wage of 12 to each of its 3 workers, and keep
the remaining 12 as residual (R = 12).
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Workers will be given 1.5 minutes to work on the simple task, just like on the training
round. Once the 1.5 minutes are up, ONE of each firm’s workers will be randomly chosen,
and the number of tasks completed by that worker (T) will help to determine the firm’s
earnings according to the equation:
Profits = 1/8*[R + 4*T], where R is the residual endowment (= endowment -
wages = 12); and T is the number of tasks completed by the chosen worker.
Workers’ wages for this stage will be 12, regardless of how many tasks they complete.
FIRST STAGE EXAMPLES
Example 1:
Suppose each of the 3 workers completes 21 tasks during the 1.5 minutes. For any
chosen worker T=21. In this stage, the endowment is 48, and the wages are 12, such
that the residual will be R = 12 ( = 48 - 3(12)).
Thus, each worker will earn 12 lab dollars, and the firm will earn 12 ( = 1/8*(12 +
4*21)).
Example 2:
Suppose workers 1 and 2 complete 23 tasks each, and worker 3 completes 18 tasks
during the 1.5 minutes. Again, the residual is R = 12. If worker 3 is chosen, T=18. Each
worker will earn 12 lab dollars, and the firm will earn 10.50 ( = 1/8*(12 + 4*18)).
However, if either worker 1 or 2 is chosen, T=23, each worker will earn 12 lab dollars,
and the firm will earn 13 ( = 1/8*(12 + 4*23)).
SECOND STAGE INSTRUCTIONS
In this stage firms will make decisions about wages for stage 3, and workers will state
their beliefs about those decisions and their impact on future wages.
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During stage 3, firms will get a 36 endowment, 12 less than they got in the
first stage, then firms will decide whether they’d prefer to bear the 12 loss, or to pass
it on to the workers in the form of wage cuts. In the latter case, wages of all 3 workers
would drop to 8 lab dollars.
Even though all firms will make choices about pay cuts, firms’ choices may or
may not matter according to which stage of the world is realized. Once firms have
made their decisions, both workers and firms will learn the state of the world, wages and
residual endowment.
There are 3 possible states of the world, which can happen with specific probabilities,
as shown in the picture below. Regardless of the firm’s choice, there is a 50% chance
that workers’ wages will be cut and a 10% chance that wages will NOT be
cut. Only 40% of the time the firm will actively choose whether or not to cut
the wage.
SECOND STAGE EXAMPLES
Example 1:
Suppose NO pay cuts happen, then R=0 ( = 36 - 3(12)); workers 1 and 2 complete
21 tasks each, and worker 3 completes 26 tasks during the 1.5 minutes.
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If either worker 1 or 2 is chosen T=21, workers will earn 12 lab dollars, and the firm
will earn 10.50 ( = 1/8*(0 + 4*21)).
However, if worker 3 is chosen, each worker will earn 12 lab dollars and the firm will
earn 13 (= 1/8*(0 + 4*26)).
Example 2:
Suppose pay cuts happen, then R=12 (= 36 - 3(8)), worker 1 completes 21 tasks,
and workers 2 and 3 complete 16 tasks each during the 1.5 minutes.
If worker 1 is chosen T=21, workers will earn 8 lab dollars, and the firm will earn 12
( = 1/8*(12 + 4*21)).
However, if either worker 2 or 3 is chosen, workers will earn 8 lab dollars, and the
firm will earn 9.50 ( = 1/8*(12 + 4*16)).
Example 3:
Suppose NO pay cuts happen, again R=0, and each of the three workers completes
24 tasks during the 1.5 minutes.
For any chosen worker T=24. Thus, each worker will earn 12 lab dollars, and the
firm will earn 12 ( = 1/8*(0 + 4*24)).
THIRD STAGE INSTRUCTIONS
First you will learn the realized state of the world, and the wages for your group in
this stage.
Then, workers will be given another 1.5 minutes to work on the task completion,
which impacts the firm’s profit.
Firms’ earnings for this stage will be determined by the realized state of the world,
the firm’s choice in the second stage (if applicable), and the productivity of one of her
three workers chosen at random.
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Figure A.1: Distribution of Effort Increase with wage = 12 units.
A.2 Graphs on the Distribution of Effort Increase
In analyzing the distribution of effort increase we notice that there is not much of
a difference in distributions when the wages are determined by randomness. However,
when the firm is allowed to choose the wage (with Intention), the distributions shift
according to treatment, to the right when wages are high, and to the left when they are
low.
For an intentional high wage, observe that the distribution for the Unfavorable Treat-
ment is skewed to the right, indicating an increase in effort that is more prominent than
its counterpart on the Favorable Treatment (Figure A.1). Meanwhile, for an intention-
ally granted low wage (Figure A.2), the distribution of effort increase is slightly skewed
to the left, and more concentrated around zero when participants faced the Favorable
Treatment.
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Figure A.2: Distribution of Effort Increase with wage = 8 units.
A.3 Robustness Check
Since several of our variables are binary, we also ran a few regressions for each specific
combination of variables (Intention / Wage / Treatment), which are presented on the
tables below. We separated them into Intentional and non-Intentional model to reduce
collinearity among models.
Notice from Table A.1 that when the firms intentionally set the wage, if wages are high
the workers will relatively increase effort when they expected a low wage (Unfavorable
Treatment), but not when the high wage was already expected. If in the other hand
wages are low, an Unfavorable Treatment also yields a bigger and marginally significant
reaction from the workers. When considering the Overall model (wages = 8 and 12) only
the unexpected high wage will yield a significant difference in effort.
When the wages are randomly determined (Table A.2), expectations do not seem
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Table A.1: Difference in Effort by Situation - Intentional
(Wage = 12) (Wage = 8) (Overall)
Unfav Treat*High Wage 1.6581*** 1.7645***
(.4695) (.4540)
Fav Treat*High Wage .3577 .7887
(.4302) (.4819)
Unfav Treat*Low Wage -2.9610** -3.0705
(1.3974) (1.7235)
Fav Treat*Low Wage -1.6768 -1.6861*
(1.4178) (1.1915)
Round Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes
N 264 273 537
R2 0.09 0.14 0.12
Significance: ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1.
Standard errors were clustered on Session.
to play a role, since regardless of treatment workers effort is lower when the wage is
high (compared to overall high wage efforts), and effort is higher when wages are low
(compared to overall low wages). Across all wages, all we find is a marginally significant
increase in effort when expected high wages are randomly granted.
72
Appendix Chapter 2 Chapter A
Table A.2: Difference in Effort by Situation - Non-Intentional
(Wage = 12) (Wage = 8) (Overall)
Unfav Treat*High Wage -1.2175** .6180
(.5117) (.8627)
Fav Treat*High Wage -.6813 .9124*
(.3933) (.4925)
Unfav Treat*Low Wage 2.2107** .4105
(1.0412) (.7407)
Fav Treat*Low Wage 2.4780* .6023
(1.3046) (.8643)
Round Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes
N 264 273 537
R2 0.08 0.13 0.07
Significance: ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1.
Standard errors were clustered on Session.
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